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FROM LORD COKE TO INTERNET PRIVACY: THE PAST, 
PRESENT, AND FUTURE OF THE LAW OF ELECTRONIC 
CONTRACTING 
JULIET M. MORINGIELLO* & WILLIAM L. REYNOLDS** 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Contract law is applied countless times every day, in every man-
ner of transaction large or small.  Rarely are those transactions re-
flected in an agreement produced by a lawyer; quite the contrary, al-
most all contracts are concluded by persons with no legal training and 
often by persons who do not have a great deal of education.1  In re-
cent years, moreover, technological advances have provided novel 
methods of creating contracts.2  Those facts present practitioners of 
contract law with an interesting conundrum: The law must be sensible 
and stable if parties are to have confidence in the security of their ar-
rangements; but contract law also must be able to handle changing 
social and economic circumstances, changes that occur at an ever-
increasing speed.  Contract law, originally designed to handle agree-
ments reached by persons familiar with one another, evolved over 
time to solve the problems posed by contract formation that was done 
at a distance—that is, contract law has developed to handle first pa-
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 1.  See Shmuel I. Becher, Behavioral Science and Consumer Standard Form Contracts, 68 
LA. L. REV. 117, 118 (2007) (“Many of our most important personal and everyday relation-
ships involve contracts or are governed by them.”); see also infra text accompanying notes 
22–23. 
 2.  See infra Parts II–III. 
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per, then telegraphic, and finally telephonic communications.3  It has 
handled those changes very well. 
In its present form, contract law can be traced back to the middle 
of the nineteenth century.4  At that time, the new worlds of the tele-
graph and the railroad led to the adoption of such novel doctrines as 
the law of consequential damages5 and the law of third-party benefi-
ciaries.6  It took a while to flesh out those and other new doctrines, 
but it is safe to say that between, say, 1932, when contract law was cod-
ified in the First Restatement,7 and 2000, contract law changed little.8  
In other words, a student who could pass a contracts exam in 1932 
could also pass the exam in 2000.  The reasons for this quiescence in 
doctrine are easy to see in retrospect.  Because there was no disruptive 
technology in the period from 1932 to 2000, the law did not have to 
respond to technological changes.9 
                                                          
 3.  See infra Parts II–III. 
 4.  Morton J. Horwitz, The Historical Foundations of Modern Contract Law, 87 HARV. L. 
REV. 917, 917 (1974). 
 5.  See Hadley v. Baxendale, (1854) 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (Exch.) 145; 9 Ex. 341, 341 
(holding that recoverable damages are those that arise naturally or those that are in the 
reasonable contemplation of the parties when they made the contract). 
 6.  See Lawrence v. Fox, 20 N.Y. 268, 274 (1859) (illustrating the principle that when 
one person makes a promise to another for the benefit of a third person, that third person 
may maintain an action for its breach). 
 7.  RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS (1932).   
 8.  This is something of an overstatement, but not much of one.  Doctrines like es-
toppel and unconscionability achieved prominence as Article 2 of the Uniform Commer-
cial Code (“UCC”) and the Restatement (Second) of Contracts were circulated beginning 
in the 1960s, but they merely softened existing doctrine.  U.C.C. § 2-302 (1957); 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 90, 208 (1979); see also Larry A. DiMatteo, Equi-
ty’s Modification of Contract: An Analysis of the Twentieth Century’s Equitable Reformation of Con-
tract Law, 33 NEW ENG. L. REV. 265, 298 (1999) (“The expanded use of equitable principles 
and the infusion of good faith into contract law in the twentieth century has led to an eq-
uitable modification of contract.”).  Those doctrines did not change the basic warp-and-
woof of the law.  See, e.g., C.M.A. McCauliff, A Historical Approach to the Contractual Ties That 
Bind Parties Together, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 841, 864 (2002) (arguing that “[p]romissory es-
toppel is simply consideration, cloaked in a new name”).   
 9.  Automobiles, television, and aviation certainly were disruptive in other areas of the 
law but those inventions led to no doctrinal changes in contracts.  But see Raymond T. 
Nimmer, Images and Contract Law—What Law Applies to Transactions in Information, 36 HOUS. 
L. REV. 1, 3 (1999) (“The contract law developed in the 1940’s and 1950’s to accommodate 
sales of toasters, automobiles, and other wares . . . .”). 
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In the 1990s, however, things began to change.  The rise in com-
puter use by individuals coupled with the advent of the World Wide 
Web gave rise to two parallel developments, both of which challenged 
the law of contract formation.  Increased computer use created a de-
mand for software programs designed for the consumer market, and 
those programs were commonly transferred to users by way of stand-
ard-form licenses that were packaged with the software and thus una-
vailable before the consumer paid for the software.10  Also, parties in 
large numbers began to use electronic means—the computer—to en-
ter into bargained-for relationships.11  The turn of the millennium 
brought two electronic contracting statutes, the Electronic Signatures 
in Global and National Commerce Act (“E-Sign”)12 and the Uniform 
Electronic Transactions Act (“UETA”),13 which removed any doubts 
that contracts entered into electronically could satisfy the Statute of 
Frauds.14  Encouraged by the certainty given by those statutes, Inter-
net businesses started offering contract terms on their websites, asking 
customers to consent to terms by clicking an icon, or by not seeking 
express assent at all by presenting terms of use by hyperlink.15 
These new methods of contracting spawned a rich body of case 
law and academic commentary.  The 1990s brought numerous cases 
in which consumers who bought packaged software challenged the 
terms that came in the boxes containing the software.  That led to 
celebrated decisions involving the terms of so-called “shrinkwrap” 
                                                          
 10.  See Nancy S. Kim, Contract’s Adaptation and the Online Bargain, 79 U. CIN. L. REV. 
1327, 1335–37 (2011) (explaining the contract practices of software companies). 
 11.  See Aashish Srivastava, Legal Understanding and Issues with Electronic Signatures—An 
Empirical Study of Large Businesses, 35 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 42, 42 (2008) (“The 
advent of the Internet transformed the world of commerce in the nineties.”).  These were 
not the first “machine-made” contracts.  In the 1950s and 1960s, some insurance compa-
nies sold flight insurance from vending machines.  See Steven v. Fid. & Cas. Co. of N.Y., 377 
P.2d 284, 286 (Cal. 1962) (describing how an airline passenger purchased a life insurance 
policy from a vending machine); Lachs v. Fid. & Cas. Co. of N.Y., 118 N.E.2d 555, 556 
(N.Y. 1954) (same). 
 12.  Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 7001–
7031 (2006). 
 13.  UNIF. ELEC. TRANSACTIONS ACT, §§ 1–21, 7A U.L.A. 211 (1999). 
 14.  Juliet M. Moringiello, Signals, Assent and Internet Contracting, 57 RUTGERS L. REV. 
1307, 1341 (2005). 
 15.  Id. at 1317–19 (explaining the presentation of contract terms via “click-wrap” and 
“browse-wrap” agreements). 
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agreements.16  At the same time, individuals tried to sue entities with 
which they had transacted electronically, only to find that their ac-
tions were barred by choice of forum and arbitration clauses found in 
online terms of service.17  At first, these parallel developments led 
some to conflate the issues involved in shrinkwrap contracting and 
electronic contracting, giving rise to a belief that new rules were 
needed to deal with electronic contracting problems.18  That belief 
gained a good deal of traction in academia and even among a few 
judges.19  Briefly, it appeared that a new law might be created for elec-
tronic contracts.20  Soon, however, the courts recognized that the le-
gal problems posed by the new technology were no different than 
those that had been presented in the preceding century and, there-
fore, judges rejected efforts to change the basic law of contracts.21 
                                                          
 16.  See, e.g., Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147, 1148–49 (7th Cir. 1997) (reason-
ing that “terms inside a box of software bind consumers who use the software after an op-
portunity to read the terms and to reject them by returning the product”); ProCD, Inc. v. 
Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1452–53 (7th Cir. 1996) (deeming the following arrangement 
permissible: a consumer “inspected the package, tried out the software, learned of the li-
cense, and did not reject the goods”); Step-Saver Data Sys., Inc. v. Wyse Tech., 939 F.2d 91, 
105 (3d Cir. 1991) (concluding that “an additional term detailed in the box-top license 
will not be incorporated into the [parties’] contract if the term’s addition to the contract 
would materially alter the [parties’] agreement”). 
 17.  See, e.g., Forrest v. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc., 805 A.2d 1007, 1010 (D.C. 2002) (up-
holding the validity of a forum selection clause when the consumer was provided adequate 
notice of its existence); Caspi v. Microsoft Network, L.L.C., 732 A.2d 528, 532–33 (N.J. Su-
per. Ct. App. Div. 1999) (same).   
 18.  See Juliet M. Moringiello & William L. Reynolds, What’s Software Got to Do with It? 
The ALI Principles of the Law of Software Contracts, 84 TUL. L. REV. 1541, 1542 (2010) [here-
inafter Moringiello & Reynolds, What’s Software Got to Do with It?] (explaining some propo-
nents’ belief that “the common law of contracts and Article 2 of the UCC [are] inappro-
priate bodies of law to govern software contracts”). 
 19.  See Moringiello, supra note 14, at 1315 (explaining that, in earlier cases, courts 
thought that offerors in machine-delivered contracts had enhanced duties); see also infra 
notes 64–84 and accompanying text.  
 20.  See Moringiello & Reynolds, What’s Software Got to Do with It?, supra note 18, at 
1541–42 (discussing the attempt to add Article 2B to the UCC). 
 21.  See Moringiello, supra note 14, at 1315 (“Today . . . courts apply the objective theo-
ry of contracts to terms delivered electronically without considering the differences be-
tween paper and electronic communications.”).  Academics were a bit slower in recogniz-
ing the continuity of contract law.  Moringiello & Reynolds, What’s Software Got to Do with 
It?, supra note 18, at 1542–43, 1553. 
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In this Article, we will discuss the development of that case law 
and try to predict what the future will bring in the area of electronic 
contracting.  We believe that, from a legal standpoint, electronic con-
tracting is no different from face-to-face contracting.  That said, as a 
Wall Street Journal writer recently observed, it is possible that we “make 
more legal agreements in a year than our grandparents made in a life-
time.”22  Our grandparents made contracts, but often they were sim-
ple and unwritten.  For example, someone who buys a book at Barnes 
& Noble enters into a contract, but it is a very simple deal for a speci-
fied book at a set price; it certainly is not anything like the 3,000-word 
Conditions of Use that Amazon.com deploys in an attempt to bind 
someone using its website.23 
The ease of presenting terms comprised of thousands of words by 
an Internet hyperlink makes it easy for a vendor in its terms of use 
and terms of service to ask us to give up privacy rights24 and intellec-
tual property rights.25  Modern communications technologies there-
fore make it easier for parties to engage in risky transactions.26  Never-
theless, we believe that, with few exceptions, the common law of 
contracts is sufficiently malleable to address the problems arising out 
of that behavior, and where it is not, regulation of contract terms is 
appropriate. 
                                                          
 22.  Eric Felten, Are We All Online Criminals?, WALL ST. J., Nov. 18, 2011, at D8.  
 23.  Conditions of Use, AMAZON.COM, http://www.amazon.com/gp/help/customer/ 
display.html/ref=hp_200905880_conditions?nodeId=508088 (last visited Nov. 14, 2012). 
 24.  For example, Amazon.com’s Privacy Notice (which Amazon.com appears to con-
sider a contract because the first paragraph of the notice contains the statement “[b]y visit-
ing Amazon.com, you are accepting the practices described in this Privacy Notice”), con-
tains more than 3,000 words and informs customers that if they do not want Amazon.com 
to share certain information, it is up to them to adjust their advertising preferences.  Ama-
zon.com Privacy Notice, AMAZON.COM, http://www.amazon.com/gp/help/customer/display. 
html/ref=footer_privacy?ie=UTF8&nodeId=468496 (last visited Nov. 14, 2012). 
 25.  Facebook became embroiled in controversy in February 2009, when it changed its 
Terms of Service to give it “an irrevocable, perpetual, non-exclusive, transferable, fully 
paid, worldwide license (to) . . . use, copy, publish, stream, store, retain, publicly perform 
or display, transmit, scan, reformat, modify, edit, frame, translate, excerpt, adapt, create 
derivative works, and distribute” content posted by its users, even after a user canceled his 
Facebook account.  See Caroline McCarthy, Facebook Faces Furor over Content Rights, 
CNN.COM/TECHNOLOGY (Feb. 18, 2009, 2:29 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2009/TECH/02 
/17/facebook.terms.service/ (reporting the change to Facebook’s Terms of Service). 
 26.  See Moringiello, supra note 14, at 1343–46 (discussing the different risks associated 
with remote and face-to-face transactions). 
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This Article will examine how the common law of contracts has 
responded to the problems of electronic contracting.  In Part II, we 
will analyze the developments in electronic contracting up to the pre-
sent, and the reaction of judges and academics.  We will pay particular 
attention to efforts to transform the common law of contracts in elec-
tronic situations.  Part III will examine the current state of the law and 
reveal how courts have responded to claims of exceptionalism for 
electronic contracts.  In Part IV, we will look at current problems in 
the field, including arbitration, privacy, and the Computer Fraud and 
Abuse Act.  Finally, Part V will reflect on the developments discussed 
earlier; in particular, it will look at why some reform efforts have 
failed and some have succeeded; whether electronic contracts should 
be treated differently from other contracts; why academics have 
pushed for unsuccessful reforms; and the amazing resilience of stand-
ard contract law in the face of extraordinary technological change. 
II.  THE PAST 
The efforts to change the common law of contracts to accommo-
date the new world of technology centered on two areas: formalities 
and formation.  In the first, change was effected by statutes swiftly 
promulgated and adopted.27  In the second, contract formation, 
change was sought, unsuccessfully, through comprehensive reform 
involving statutory and common law changes.28  These efforts were in-
teresting in part because they singled out a separate area—contracts 
for information, many of which are formed electronically—as needing 
a different law from that applied to all other agreements.29  That ef-
fort failed because information transactions were sufficiently new that 
there was no consensus as to the appropriate norms for such transac-
tions.30  In the end, the common law of contracts won out, and for-
                                                          
 27.  See infra Part II.A. 
 28.  See infra Part II.B. 
 29.  See UNIF. COMPUTER INFO. TRANSACTIONS ACT, 7 U.L.A. 199, introductory cmt. 
(2002) (stating that the Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act was designed to 
deal with transactions in computer information because they involve “different expecta-
tions, different industry practices, and different policies from transactions in goods”). 
 30.  As a point of contrast, one of the original goals of the drafters of the UCC in the 
1940s was to enforce trade norms in commercial law.  See Allen R. Kamp, Uptown Act: A His-
tory of the Uniform Commercial Code: 1940–49, 51 S.M.U. L. REV. 275, 281–83 (1998) (explain-
ing Karl Llewellyn’s goals in drafting Article 2 of the UCC). 
  
458 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72:452 
mation issues in the digital world are handled by long-familiar lines of 
analysis.31 
A.  Formalities 
Although traditional contract law was based on the assumption 
that parties negotiate and sign paper contracts in face-to-face transac-
tions, or after the exchange of offer and acceptance through the reg-
ular mail, the law has long recognized less traditional forms of con-
tracting.  The Uniform Commercial Code (“UCC”), in its battle of the 
forms section, bestows contract status on an exchange of conflicting 
boilerplate forms.32  Courts developed the reasonable communica-
tiveness test to hold that standard-form terms are binding so long as 
the offeree has reasonable notice of those terms.33  And the law has 
recognized that there does not have to be a “magic moment” when 
the contract springs into existence; it is enough that the parties’ con-
duct establishes the existence of a contract.34  Even when the law has 
required that a contract have a “signature” to satisfy the Statute of 
Frauds, it has long been the case that marks such as a letterhead 
could suffice as a signature.35 
Nevertheless, there was a sense at the very end of the twentieth 
century that something more was needed to ensure that contracts 
could be entered into in the electronic environment.  Despite the fact 
that courts had held that contracts other than those written on paper 
and signed in ink could be enforced, numerous statutes requiring 
writings and signatures were thought to impose barriers to electronic 
                                                          
 31.  See Moringiello, supra note 14, at 1320 (describing courts’ “zeal to treat paper and 
electronic contracts in an identical manner”). 
 32.  U.C.C. § 2-207 (2011). 
 33.  See, e.g., Wallis v. Princess Cruises, Inc., 306 F.3d 827, 835 (9th Cir. 2002) (employ-
ing the reasonable communicativeness test); Effron v. Sun Line Cruises, Inc., 67 F.3d 7, 9 
(2d Cir. 1995) (same); Shankles v. Costa Armatori, S.P.A., 722 F.2d 861, 866–67 (1st Cir. 
1983) (same); Silvestri v. Italia Società per Azioni di Navigazione, 388 F.2d 11, 17–18 (2d 
Cir. 1968) (same).  
 34.  U.C.C. § 2-204 (2011). 
 35.  See, e.g., Owen v. Kroger Co., 936 F. Supp. 579, 585 (S.D. Ind. 1996) (holding that 
preprinted wording on a memorandum form could constitute a signature for Statute of 
Frauds purposes); Durham v. Harbin, 530 So.2d 208, 210 (Ala. 1988) (recognizing that in 
the appropriate circumstances, letterhead could suffice as a signature). 
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commerce.36  Several states responded by enacting digital signature 
statutes, which required the use of specific technologies and encryp-
tion standards to create a binding signature.37  Because the market-
place did not embrace the standards mandated by those statutes, the 
statutes were viewed as failures.38 
The end of the twentieth century saw the adoption of two elec-
tronic transactions statutes: UETA, promulgated by the National Con-
ference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (“NCCUSL”) in 
1999, and in effect in forty-seven states and the District of Columbia,39 
and E-Sign, passed by Congress and signed into law by President Clin-
ton in 2000.40  Both statutes were designed to eliminate barriers to 
electronic commerce.41  These statutes are not identical twins, but E-
Sign’s reverse pre-emption rule requires E-Sign to yield to state law if 
the state in question has adopted UETA in the form promulgated by 
NCCUSL.42  Congress enacted E-Sign at the behest of financial institu-
tions and high-tech companies, who were afraid that the failure of 
states to enact UETA in a rapid, uniform manner would stymie their 
businesses.43 
                                                          
 36.  See Patricia Brumfield Fry, Introduction to the Uniform Electronic Transactions Act: Prin-
ciples, Policies and Provisions, 37 IDAHO L. REV. 237, 241 (2001) (“Each local, state, or na-
tional law or regulation that requires a writing or signature, delivery, or production of an 
original record impairs electronic commerce.”). 
 37.  See Robert A. Wittie & Jane K. Winn, Electronic Signatures Under the Federal E-SIGN 
Legislation and the UETA, 56 BUS. LAW. 293, 294–96 (2000) (discussing Utah’s use of asym-
metric cryptography, a specific authentication technology for electronic signatures). 
 38.  See Jane K. Winn, The Emperor’s New Clothes: The Shocking Truth About Digital Signa-
tures and Internet Commerce, 37 IDAHO L. REV. 353, 379 (2001) (“Laws such as the Utah Digi-
tal Signature Act, which describe a specific implementation of asymmetric cryptography 
within a public key infrastructure, have been consigned to the margins of electronic com-
merce when the marketplace failed to embrace their vision of digital signatures.”).  
 39.  Electronic Transactions Act Summary, UNIF. L. COMM’N, http://uniformlaws.org/Act 
Summary.aspx?title=Electronic%20Transactions%20Act (last visited Nov. 16, 2012); see also 
Uniform Electronic Transactions Act, NAT’L CONF. OF ST. LEGS., http://www.ncsl.org/issues-
research/telecom/uniform-electronic-transactions-acts.aspx (last visited Nov. 16, 2012) 
(listing which states have enacted the UETA). 
 40.  Michael J. Hays, Note, The E-Sign Act of 2000: The Triumph of Function over Form in 
American Contract Law, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1183, 1183 (2001). 
 41.  UNIF. ELEC. TRANSACTIONS ACT, 7A U.L.A. 211, introductory cmt. (1999); see also 
Hays, supra note 40, at 1184 & n.6 (highlighting the significance of E-Sign). 
 42.  15 U.S.C. § 7002(a) (2006). 
 43.  Wittie & Winn, supra note 37, at 296–97. 
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The primary impact of these statutes is in their pronouncement 
that a contract cannot be denied enforcement solely because it is in 
electronic form or signed electronically.  The laws take a broad view 
of the concept of electronic signing by providing a technology-neutral 
definition of signature.44  Importantly, these two statutes are not gen-
eral contracting statutes.45  Questions of formation, therefore, are un-
touched by UETA and E-Sign and are left to the common law of con-
tracts.46 
B.  Formation 
Courts had little trouble resolving formation issues in the very 
early electronic contracting cases.47  Confusion arose about a dozen 
years ago when academics developed a formation typology based on 
an artificial dichotomy between what became known as “clickwrap” 
and “browsewrap”;48 some courts followed that typology.  In more re-
cent years, however, judges have rejected that false dichotomy and re-
turned to the traditional formation test of reasonable communica-
tiveness.49  This Section tells the story of the rise and fall of the 
“wraps”—both click and browse. 
                                                          
 44.  15 U.S.C. § 7006(5) (2006); UNIF. ELEC. TRANSACTIONS ACT § 2(8), 7A U.L.A. 211 
(1999).   
 45.  Moringiello, supra note 14, at 1340–41. 
 46.  Id. at 1343 (arguing that “[t]he statutes preserve the substantive law of contracts”). 
 47.  See Moringiello & Reynolds, What’s Software Got to Do with It?, supra note 18, at 1550 
(“Courts in the early cases often held, with little discussion, that an offeree could be con-
tractually bound to electronic terms simply by clicking an ‘I agree’ icon on the Web site.”). 
 48.  See, e.g., Robert A. Hillman & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Standard-Form Contracting in the 
Electronic Age, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 429, 464 (2002) (“Consumers enter into electronic con-
tracts in two distinct ways: ‘browsewrap’ and ‘clickwrap’ contracts.”); Mark A. Lemley, 
Terms of Use, 91 MINN. L. REV. 459, 459–60 (2006) (describing the different judicial ap-
proaches to clickwrap and browsewrap terms); Robert L. Oakley, Fairness in Electronic Con-
tracting: Minimum Standards for Non-Negotiated Contracts, 42 HOUS. L. REV. 1041, 1051–54 
(2005) (discussing clickwrap and browsewrap as distinct methods of contract formation); 
Maureen A. O’Rourke, Common Law and Statutory Restrictions on Access: Contract, Trespass, 
and the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 2002 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 295, 297–99 (2002) 
(explaining clickwrap and browsewrap methods of formation and noting that courts gen-
erally uphold clickwrap agreements and are split on the enforceability of browsewrap 
agreements).  
 49.  See Moringiello & Reynolds, What’s Software Got to Do with It?, supra note 18, at 1550 
(describing courts’ recognition that “the line between clickwrap and browsewrap can be 
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Contract law developed in a world of face-to-face exchanges 
among persons who knew one another, at least by reputation.50  It 
evolved over the centuries to deal with the impersonal world of mass 
market transactions.51  Mass market contracting has long been carried 
out using standard paper forms leaving little or no room for negotia-
tion; these agreements are often called contracts of adhesion.52  Some 
mass market contracts (for automobiles, for instance) require signa-
tures, others (travel tickets) do not, but all share a boilerplate format, 
presented in a manner that discourages reading.53  Mass market paper 
contract forms, in other words, have much in common with forms 
presented electronically.54  One would imagine, therefore, that the 
two would be treated in similar fashion.  Initially, it looked like that 
would be the case. 
The first courts to hold that terms of service to which a buyer was 
required to agree by clicking an “I agree” button were enforceable 
never used the word “clickwrap.”55  The plaintiff in Groff v. America 
Online, Inc.56 was an experienced lawyer who argued that he should 
not be bound by AOL’s forum selection clause in its service agree-
ment because he never saw, read, nor agreed to be bound by it.57  The 
court, noting that the plaintiff could not have obtained AOL’s services 
without either clicking an “I agree” button next to a hyperlink that 
said “read now” or clicking an “I agree” button at the end of the 
terms, stressed the duty to read.58  By clicking “I agree,” the plaintiff 
                                                          
blurry”); see also Moringiello, supra note 14, at 1314 (stating that “judges have clung to tra-
ditional contract doctrine”). 
 50.  See Moringiello, supra note 14, at 1311 (stating that “rules of traditional contact 
law” are “based on the ideal of two humans meeting in person to agree to terms”). 
 51.  Id. at 1313–15. 
 52.  See Oakley, supra note 48, at 1053 (providing the characteristics of contracts of ad-
hesion). 
 53.  See Moringiello, supra note 14, at 1313 (explaining that “[s]tandard form contracts 
take many forms”). 
 54.  Id. at 1315. 
 55.  The earliest cases dealt with terms offered by Internet service providers, such as 
America Online and Microsoft.  See, e.g., Forrest v. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc., 805 A.2d 1007, 
1010 (D.C. 2002) (holding valid a clickwrap agreement required to purchase Internet ser-
vice); Caspi v. Microsoft Network, L.L.C., 732 A.2d 528, 529–31 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 
1999) (same). 
 56.  No. PC 97-0331, 1998 R.I. Super. Ct. LEXIS 46 (R.I. Super. Ct. May 27, 1998). 
 57.  Id. at *12. 
 58.  Id. at *12–13. 
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effectively signed the terms of service, and “a party who signs an in-
strument manifests his assent to it and cannot later complain that he 
did not read the instrument or that he did not understand its con-
tents.”59 
Similarly, the court in Caspi v. Microsoft Network, L.L.C.,60 another 
case challenging a forum selection clause, focused on the buyer’s op-
portunity to review the offered terms rather than any special charac-
teristics of clickwrap contracts.  Like the court in Groff, the court in 
Caspi never used the term “clickwrap.”61  Rather, the court looked for 
evidence that the plaintiff had ample opportunity to read the pre-
sented terms and found that the challenged clause was not presented 
less conspicuously than other clauses.62  Because the court found that 
the plaintiff had the opportunity to read the terms and refused to find 
a significant difference between terms presented on paper and terms 
presented electronically, the plaintiff was bound by the forum selec-
tion clause.63 
Academics were not content with this state of affairs, however.  
They developed a typology based on clickwrap and browsewrap to an-
alyze formation problems in electronic transactions.  They did so in 
part because of their opposition to the Uniform Computer Infor-
mation Transactions Act (“UCITA”),64 a widely reviled project that 
spent part of its gestation period as the proposed Article 2B to the 
UCC.65  The UCITA was designed as a comprehensive contracts code 
for computer information transactions, and its proponents believed 
that such a law was necessary to deal with the “widely diverse and rich 
array of methods for distributing and tailoring digital information to 
the modern marketplace.”66  Among these new methods were shrink-
wrap and clickwrap. 
                                                          
 59.  Id. at *13. 
 60.  732 A.2d 528 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1999). 
 61.  Id. at 528. 
 62.  Id. at 532. 
 63.  Id. at 532–33. 
 64.  See UNIF. COMPUTER INFO. TRANSACTIONS ACT, 7 U.L.A. 199 (2002).  We discuss 
UCITA in more detail later in this Article.  See infra notes 73–76 and accompanying text.  
 65.  See Richard E. Speidel, Revising UCC Article 2: A View from the Trenches, 52 HASTINGS 
L.J. 607, 607–10 (2001) (describing the process of revising Article 2 of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code). 
 66.  UNIF. COMPUTER INFO. TRANSACTIONS ACT, 7 U.L.A. 199, introductory cmt. 
(2002). 
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At first, there were some signs that such a regime would be put in 
place.  Although there was little case law on point, academics and 
some courts tried to establish the outlines of that new order.67  That 
effort was especially notable in the area of offer and acceptance where 
terms like “browsewrap” and “clickwrap” became quite common in 
discussions about electronic contracting.68 
Commentators originally used the words “clickwrap” and 
“browsewrap” to refer to “pay now, terms later” presentations of con-
tract terms.69  Such a presentation offends the tenets of contract law—
surely an offeree cannot accept terms of which she has no notice at 
the time of “acceptance.”70  The etymology of browsewrap and click-
wrap can be traced to shrinkwrap, a term used to refer to the license 
terms that could be found in a box of packaged software.71  Scholars 
found a lot to dislike about shrinkwrap—not only did such a presenta-
tion fly in the face of traditional contract formation doctrine, the con-
tent of the shrinkwrap terms wreaked havoc on the balance struck by 
the federal intellectual property statutes.72 
                                                          
 67.  See Katy Hull, The Overlooked Concern with the Uniform Computer Information Transac-
tions Act, 51 HASTING L.J. 1391, 1394 (2000) (“Courts have had some difficulty in assessing 
these clickwrap and skrinkwrap contracts, and there is little case law thus far addressing 
the issue.”). 
 68.  See, e.g., Oakley, supra note 48, at 1051–54 (discussing offer and acceptance 
through the browsewrap/clickwrap distinction). 
 69.  See, e.g., Viva R. Moffat, The Wrong Tool for the Job: The IP Problem with Noncompetition 
Agreements, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 873, 890 (2010) (“[S]hrinkwrap and clickwrap contracts 
have presented a ‘pay now, terms later’ situation.”). 
 70.  See Juliet M. Moringiello & William L. Reynolds, Electronic Contracting Cases 2009–
2010, 66 BUS. LAW. 175, 176 (2010) (explaining what constitutes adequate notice for pur-
poses of acceptance). 
 71.  See, e.g., Robert Lee Dickens, Finding Common Ground in the World of Electronic Con-
tracts: The Consistency of Legal Reasoning in Clickwrap Cases, 11 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 
379, 381 (2007) (stating that “‘[t]he term ‘clickwrap’ evolved from the use of ‘shrinkwrap’ 
agreements”). 
 72.  See Dennis S. Karjala, Federal Preemption of Shrinkwrap and On-Line Licenses, 22 U. 
DAYTON L. REV. 511, 512–14 (1997) (explaining that although copyright law protects works 
of authorship, some elements of those works are left unprotected so that they can be freely 
used by future creators and that shrinkwrap contracts that restrict the rights of the public 
(including future creators) are inconsistent with copyright law); Mark A. Lemley, Intellectu-
al Property and Shrinkwrap Licenses, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1239, 1240 (1995) (arguing that 
“shrinkwrap licenses should not be effective to alter the balance of rights created under 
federal law”).  
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By 1999, the term “clickwrap” was common in academic par-
lance, particularly in articles discussing the UCC Article 2B (later 
UCITA) project.73  The critics of Article 2B were concerned about a 
provision in the Act that specifically permitted formation of a contract 
by shrinkwrap or clickwrap. Mark Lemley warned that Article 2B 
would “redefine[] what constitutes a contract, abandoning the focus 
on offer and acceptance . . . in favor of a rule that the intellectual 
property owner’s standard form terms will be enforced, even if they 
are contained in a ‘shrinkwrap’ or ‘clickwrap’ license that the buyer 
cannot see until the transaction has already occurred.”74  He went on 
to note that the Article 2B view was, at that time, held by a minority of 
courts.75  In addition, there were questions about whether what be-
came UCITA reflected established industry practices, questions that 
doomed its widespread enactment.76 
So where did the term “clickwrap” come from and why did it start 
to gain significance in case law?  The earliest judicial mention of the 
term was not in a contract formation opinion, but in a 1999 jurisdic-
tion opinion.77  The court in Stomp v. NeatO78 explained that “the term 
‘clickwrap agreement’ is borrowed from the idea of ‘shrinkwrap 
agreements,’ which are generally license agreements placed inside the 
cellophane ‘shrinkwrap’ of computer software boxes that, by their 
terms, become effective once the ‘shrinkwrap’ is opened.”79 
The provenance of the term “clickwrap” is unfortunate for sever-
al reasons.  First, today’s clickwrap terms are fundamentally different 
from the reviled “pure” shrinkwrap terms that become binding as 
                                                          
 73.  See, e.g., A. Michael Froomkin, Article 2B as Legal Software for Electronic Contracting—
Operating System or Trojan Horse, 13 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1023, 1052 (1998) (discussing how 
clickwrap may satisfy Article 2B of the UCC); Mark A. Lemley, Beyond Preemption: The Law 
and Policy of Intellectual Property Licensing, 87 CALIF. L. REV. 111, 119–20 (1999) [hereinafter 
Lemley, Beyond Preemption] (explaining how Article 2B of the UCC “redefines what consti-
tutes a contract,” allowing a clickwrap agreement to be enforced). 
 74.  Lemley, Beyond Preemption, supra note 73, at 119–20. 
 75.  Id. 
 76.  Amelia H. Boss, Taking UCITA on the Road: What Lessons Have We Learned?, 7 ROGER 
WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 167, 202–03 (2001). 
 77.  The first academic reference to “clickwrap” apparently is Michel A. Jaccard, Secur-
ing Copyright in Transnational Cyberspace: The Case for Contracting with Potential Infringers, 35 
COLUM. J TRANSNAT’L L. 619, 633 & n.69 (1997).  
 78.  61 F. Supp. 2d 1074 (C.D. Cal. 1999) 
 79.  Id. at 1080 n.11. 
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soon as a purchaser breaks the plastic enclosing the software box.80  
Pure shrinkwrap transactions are indeed “pay first, terms later” deals.  
In the early days of mass market software contracting, however, 
shrinkwrap and clickwrap were twin concepts.  A buyer would pur-
chase software in a box that contained paper terms that became bind-
ing when the buyer broke the shrinkwrap, and then when the buyer 
inserted the disk in her computer, a click-to-agree license would ap-
pear on the computer screen and the buyer would not be able to use 
the software until she clicked her assent.81  In the early world of mass 
market software licenses, shrinkwrap and clickwrap were objectiona-
ble for the same reason: They were “pay first, terms later” methods of 
contract formation. 
The term “clickwrap” as imported into the general world of to-
day’s electronic contracts may appear, on the surface, to refer to a 
shrinkwrap-type transaction, but in fact the term refers to something 
very different.  A transaction in which an offeree is asked to click her 
agreement either at the end of the terms or next to a hyperlink lead-
ing to the terms is not a “pay first, terms later” transaction because the 
buyer has the opportunity to review the terms before payment.  In 
fact, some have noted that a person sitting at a computer might have 
more time to review standard terms than someone standing at a coun-
ter in a crowded store with a long line of impatient customers behind 
her.82  Yet, the mere whiff of Article 2B or UCITA is like the smell of 
rotting garbage to the opponents of those proposed laws, so anything 
blessed by the drafters of those statutes must perforce be suspect, 
whether it is clickwrap in its traditional meaning of “pay first, terms 
later” or clickwrap as applied to terms that are prominently displayed 
before payment.83  Therefore, in the minds of some commentators, 
                                                          
 80.  See Dickens, supra note 71, at 381 (explaining that, while shrinkwrap terms “be-
come effective following the expiration of a predefined return period,” clickwrap terms 
“typically pop up before a purchased software disc can be installed . . . or while a service is 
being requested on the Internet”). 
 81.  This early method of software delivery is described in i.Lan Systems, Inc. v. Netscout 
Service Level Corp., 183 F. Supp. 2d 328, 329 (D. Mass. 2002). 
 82.  Hillman & Rachlinski, supra note 48, at 478. 
 83.  See, e.g., Leo L. Clarke, Performance Risk, Form Contracts and UCITA, 7 MICH. 
TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 1, 32 (2001) (“There is persuasive scholarship, employing 
both law and economics and conceptual approaches, holding that form terms in shrink-
wraps and clickwraps should not be enforced.  UCITA takes the opposite approach.”). 
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clickwrap was something both suspicious and exotic that begged to be 
dealt with differently.84 
In the world of electronic contracts, however, clickwrap is a 
meaningless term.  Click-to-agree transactions come in many flavors.  
Sometimes the click is at the end of the terms so that a reader must at 
least scroll through to reach the “I agree” icon, while other times the 
click is next to a hyperlink that leads to the terms, either in one click 
or in several.85  Whether terms are classified as clickwrap says little 
about whether the offeree had notice of them.  Yet some courts gave 
their stamp of approval to clickwrap terms simply because they were 
clickwrap terms: you click, you agree.86  Courts eventually noticed the 
differences among the various types of clickwrap and began to avoid a 
general approval of clickwrap acceptances, asking instead whether the 
“click” satisfies the test of “reasonable communicativeness.”87 
Browsewrap is burdened by a similarly unfortunate history.  Early 
website terms of use were typically hidden behind a hyperlink in small 
print at the bottom of a web page and provided that use, or browsing, 
of the website constituted acceptance of the terms.88  Classic browse-
                                                          
 84.  See supra note 48 and accompanying text. 
 85.  See Hull, supra note 67, at 1392–93 (describing different methods of presenting 
clickwrap agreements).  
 86.  See DeJohn v. .TV Corp. Int’l, 245 F. Supp. 2d 913, 919 (C.D. Ill. 2003) (finding no 
reason to distinguish the duty to read terms offered in an electronic format from the duty 
to read terms offered on paper); i.Lan Sys., 183 F. Supp. 2d at 338 (“In short, i.LAN explic-
itly accepted the clickwrap license agreement when it clicked on the box stating ‘I 
agree.’”); Forrest v. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc., 805 A.2d 1007, 1010 (D.C. 2002) (applying 
the rule that “one who signs a contract is bound by a contract which he has an opportunity 
to read whether he does so or not”).  Some courts continue to find that clickwrap terms, 
merely because they are clickwrap terms, are reasonably communicated to their readers.  
See TradeComet.com L.L.C. v. Google, Inc., 693 F. Supp. 2d 370, 377 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (not-
ing that “‘clickwrap’ agreements that require a user to accept the agreement before pro-
ceeding are ‘reasonably communicated’ to the user”), aff’d, 647 F.3d 472 (2d Cir. 2011). 
 87.  See, e.g., Fteja v. Facebook, Inc., 841 F. Supp. 2d 829, 835–41 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (ap-
plying the reasonable communicativeness test); Feldman v. Google, Inc., 513 F. Supp. 2d 
229, 236 (E.D. Pa. 2007) (applying the reasonableness test to determine enforceability of a 
clickwrap agreement); Hotels.com, L.P. v. Canales, 195 S.W.3d 147, 156 (Tex. Ct. App. 
2006) (analyzing whether an Internet consumer had “sufficient notice” of a contract’s 
terms); see also Moringiello, supra note 14, at 1330–32 (noting the problems with courts 
“holding that a click equals assent”). 
 88.  Moringiello, supra note 14, at 1318. 
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wrap is the equivalent of a “pay now, terms later” transaction.89  Natu-
rally, in order to reach the terms, usually by a hyperlink from the 
site’s home page, the website user was required to use or browse the 
site. This model persists on many sites today, even when it is likely that 
the website owner is indifferent as to whether anyone pays attention 
to the terms.90 
Courts sometimes used the clickwrap/browsewrap distinction to 
strike down browsewrap terms categorically.  One commonly cited 
case was the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit’s 
opinion in Specht v. Netscape Communications Corp.,91 in which the court 
held that a software license that did not require a click for assent was 
unenforceable.92  Although some pointed to this case as evidence that 
courts frowned on browsewrap,93 the presentation of terms in Specht 
was particularly troubling.  Not only did the link to the license terms 
appear “below the fold” of the computer screen, but also the button 
that the consumer was required to click said “Download” rather than 
“I agree” or something of similar import.94 
It is not surprising, therefore, that the Second Circuit since Specht 
has made clear that it did not intend a blanket condemnation of 
browsewrap.  The question in Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc.,95 was 
whether terms of use, which were only posted after a query had been 
                                                          
 89.  See Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, Some Realities of Online Contracting, 19 SUP. CT. 
ECON. REV. 11, 12 (2011) (suggesting similarities between browsewrap and “pay now, 
terms later” contracts). 
 90.  See, e.g., Terms of Service, N.Y.TIMES.COM, http://www.nytimes.com/content/help/ 
rights/terms/terms-of-service.html (last visited Nov. 8, 2012) (stating that “[i]f you choose 
to use NYTimes.com . . . you will be agreeing to abide by all of the terms and conditions of 
these Terms of Service”); Terms of Use, GAWKER MEDIA, http://advertising.gawker.com/ 
legal/ (last visited Nov. 18, 2012) (asking users to “[p]lease read [the terms] carefully be-
fore proceeding to access any of the GM Sites or Gawker Media content.  Your use of the 
GM Sites indicates your agreement to abide by the Terms of Use in effect”); see also infra 
notes 283–287 and accompanying text. 
 91.  306 F.3d 17 (2d Cir. 2002). 
 92.  Id. at 35. 
 93.  See Erin Ann O’Hara, Choice of Law for Internet Transactions: The Uneasy Case for 
Online Consumer Protection, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1883, 1929–30 (2005) (citing Specht to sup-
port the position that “[c]ourts . . . have frowned on the enforcement of terms that are not 
made reasonably available to the purchaser”). 
 94.  Specht, 306 F.3d at 35. 
 95.  356 F.3d 393 (2d Cir. 2004). 
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sent to the website, could be part of the contract.96  Although that 
presentation clearly was not clickwrap, the court still found the user 
bound by the terms.97  That holding rested on the fact that the user 
was a repeat visitor to the website and, therefore, at least after the first 
use, should have known of the terms.98  In short, the terms had been 
reasonably communicated to the user.99  Other courts have followed 
Register.com,100 and it is safe to say today that questions of offer and ac-
ceptance will be analyzed the same whether the transaction is elec-
tronic, oral, or on paper.101 
More recently, courts have rejected the clickwrap/browsewrap 
inquiry in favor of an unconscionability based approach to the en-
forceability of contract terms presented electronically.102  Thus, courts 
increasingly have used procedural unconscionability to strike down 
arbitration and other choice of forum clauses.103  This focus is a posi-
tive development, because it leads courts away from a focus on the 
meaningless clickwrap/browsewrap distinction and toward a discus-
                                                          
 96.  Id. at 430–31. 
 97.  See id. at 401–04 (concluding that the user knew Register.com’s terms and was 
bound by them). 
 98.  Id. at 401–02. 
 99.  See Moringiello, supra note 14, at 1314 (indicating that, under the “reasonable 
communicativeness” test, notice of terms can substitute for the standard contract require-
ment of a meeting of the minds). 
 100.  See, e.g., Hines v. Overstock.com, Inc., 668 F. Supp. 2d 362, 366–67 (E.D.N.Y. 2009) 
(citing Register.com and focusing on whether the plaintiff had actual notice of a website’s 
terms), aff’d, 380 F. App’x 22 (2d Cir. 2010); Sw. Airlines Co. v. BoardFirst, L.L.C., No. 
3:06-CV-0891-B, 2007 WL 4823761, at *6–7 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 12, 2007) (same); Hotels.com, 
L.P. v. Canales, 195 S.W.3d 147, 155–56 (Tex. Ct. App. 2006) (same).  
 101.  See Hines, 668 F. Supp. 2d at 366 (“The making of contracts over the internet has 
not fundamentally changed the principles of contract.” (citation omitted) (internal quota-
tion marks omitted)). 
 102.  See, e.g., Feldman v. Google, Inc., 513 F. Supp. 2d 229, 232–33, 243 (E.D. Pa. 2007) 
(determining that an Internet agreement was not unconscionable); Comb v. PayPal, Inc., 
218 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1169–70, 1177 (N.D. Cal. 2002) (concluding that the user agree-
ment, which was presented electronically, was substantively unconscionable). 
 103.  Juliet M. Moringiello & William L. Reynolds, Survey of the Law of Cyberspace: Electron-
ic Contracting Cases 2006–2007, 63 BUS. LAW. 219, 224–30 (2007) (discussing how courts 
applied the concept of procedural unconscionability). 
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sion of the actual presentation of the terms.104  This is consistent with 
traditional contract law; the unconscionability doctrine protects con-
sumers, at least theoretically, against “one-sided terms to which they 
did not subjectively agree.”105  Procedural unconscionability alone is 
generally not enough to invalidate contract terms; some measure of 
substantive unconscionability is required as well.106  Electronic con-
tracting adds nothing new to the substantive unconscionability analy-
sis; if terms are overly harsh or one-sided on paper, there is no reason 
that they should be more so in the online environment.107  The pro-
cedural unconscionability analysis, however, focuses on the presenta-
tion of terms and asks whether there is any unfair surprise in the 
presentation.108  Such unfair surprise is often found when terms are 
hidden in a document.109  New technologies may make it easier to 
present terms clearly, but they can also make it more difficult for an 
offeree to find important terms.110  Courts that strike down electronic 
contract terms on unconscionability grounds recognize this.111 
After the initial flood of “you click, you agree” cases, courts seem 
to be drawing more nuanced distinctions between online terms.  In 
2006, we noted that some courts recognized that business-to-
consumer electronic contracts should be treated differently from 
                                                          
 104.  Hillman & Rachlinski, supra note 48, at 492 (asserting that “courts must continue 
to scrutinize the electronic environment for abusive contracting procedures and terms, 
just as in the paper world”). 
 105.  Wayne R. Barnes, Toward a Fairer Model of Consumer Assent to Standard Form Con-
tracts: In Defense of Restatement Subsection 211(3), 82 WASH. L. REV. 227, 230 (2007). 
 106.  See Doe v. SexSearch.com, 502 F. Supp. 2d 719, 734 (N.D. Ohio 2007) (indicating 
that both procedural and substantive unconscionability must be found for a contract to be 
deemed unconscionable), aff’d, 551 F.3d 412 (6th Cir. 2008); Comb, 218 F. Supp. 2d at 
1173 (noting that even if an agreement is procedurally unconscionable, “it may nonethe-
less be enforceable if the substantive terms are reasonable”). 
 107.  See Hillman & Rachlinski, supra note 48, at 487 (suggesting that electronic con-
tracts are governed by the same law as paper contracts). 
 108.  Nagrampa v. MailCoups, Inc., 469 F.3d 1257, 1280 (9th Cir. 2006); Bragg v. Lin-
den Res., Inc., 487 F. Supp. 2d 593, 605–06 (E.D. Pa. 2007). 
 109.  Nagrampa, 469 F.3d at 1280; Bragg, 487 F. Supp. 2d at 605. 
 110.  Hillman & Rachlinski, supra note 48, at 478–79 (explaining how the Internet has 
impacted consumers’ ability to understand agreement terms).  
 111.  See, e.g., Bragg, 487 F. Supp. 2d at 606–07 (concluding that an arbitration provision 
in an online agreement was procedurally unconscionable when it was “buried . . . in a 
lengthy paragraph under the benign heading ‘GENERAL PROVISIONS’”). 
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business-to-business electronic contracts.112  That should not be news 
to contracts buffs; these courts recognize that unconscionability is not 
a doctrine that lives only in law school casebooks. 
It is now clear that the predictions of a new order were wrong.  
The common law of contracts proved more than resilient enough to 
handle the problems of the new era with ease.113  In contract for-
mation, for example, courts quickly discarded efforts to develop new 
categories based on where contract terms are placed on the screen.114  
Instead, the focus of the courts is where it always has been: Did the 
buyer have a reasonable opportunity to learn of the terms?115 
III.  THE PRESENT 
In the past couple of years, aggrieved parties have continued to 
argue that they are not bound by electronically presented terms, and 
courts have continued to analyze those terms using a no-
tice/unconscionability framework rather than a click-
wrap/browsewrap framework.116  One court, recognizing the artificial-
ity of a clickwrap/browsewrap dichotomy, described hyperlinked 
                                                          
 112.  See Juliet M. Moringiello & William L. Reynolds, Survey of the Law of Cyberspace: Elec-
tronic Contracting Cases 2005–2006, 62 BUS. LAW. 195, 205 (2006) (discussing Aral v. Earth-
link, Inc., 36 Cal. Rptr. 3d 229 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005), in which the court refused to enforce a 
class action waiver and an arbitration clause on unconscionability grounds).  For our dis-
cussion of consumer contracts, see infra notes 121–139 and accompanying text. 
 113.  See John M. Norwood, A Summary of Statutory and Case Law Associated with Contract-
ing in the Electronic Universe, 4 DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L.J. 415, 449 (2006) (summarizing how 
“courts have had no trouble applying well known legal principles to electronic contracts”). 
 114.  See, e.g., Specht v. Netscape Commc’ns Corp., 306 F.3d 17, 28–30 (2d Cir. 2002) 
(evaluating the enforceability of an electronic agreement by applying traditional contract 
principles of notice and manifestation of assent); Forrest v. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc., 805 
A.2d 1007, 1010 (D.C. 2002) (focusing on whether an electronic agreement was reasona-
bly communicated to the plaintiff); Caspi v. Microsoft Network, L.L.C., 732 A.2d 528, 532 
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1999) (affirming that “there is no significant distinction” be-
tween electronic and paper contracts). 
 115.  See, e.g., Forrest, 805 A.2d at 1010 (analyzing whether a forum selection clause was 
reasonably communicated to the consumer); Caspi, 732 A.2d at 53 (determining whether 
plaintiffs had adequate notice of a forum selection clause). 
 116.  Swift v. Zynga Game Network, Inc., 805 F. Supp. 2d 904, 910–12 (N.D. Cal. 2011); 
Hoffman v. Supplements Togo Mgmt., L.L.C., 18 A.3d 210, 214 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 
2011). 
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terms combined with an “Allow” icon as “modified clickwrap.”117  In 
another recent case, the court acknowledged the irrelevance of the 
clickwrap/browsewrap distinction and proceeded to “resolve the ju-
risdictional issue in the present case based upon more fundamental 
grounds: the absence of reasonable notice to consumers, and the 
manifestly unfair manner in which defendants’ website was struc-
tured.”118  There are exceptions; some judges continue to state simply 
that “clickwrap agreements are valid and enforceable contracts” with-
out analyzing whether the terms are presented in such a way that they 
are reasonably communicated to the offeree.119  There is probably lit-
tle harm in such an approach; after all, if an individual is asked to 
click to signify her assent to something, she is at least on notice to find 
out what that something is.  Even so, today’s courts do not categorical-
ly dismiss browsewrap; rather, they stress that in order for a website 
user to assent to terms classified as browsewrap, that user must have 
actual or constructive notice of the terms.120 
The more interesting recent cases have dealt with the modifica-
tion of online terms.  It is surprising that courts have had few oppor-
tunities to establish rules for the effective modification of online 
agreements, despite the proliferation of online terms that purport to 
allow the website owner to modify them at any time without any ex-
press consent on the part of the website user.121  There have been very 
few reported cases (and one highly publicized controversy involving 
Facebook122) addressing modification.123  Of course, the fact that case 
law on this issue is limited does not mean that all businesses are pre-
                                                          
 117.  Swift, 805 F. Supp. 2d at 910. 
 118.  Hoffman, 18 A.3d at 220.  The facts of this case are too good to ignore: The plain-
tiff was a lawyer who bought a male enhancement supplement through the defendant’s 
website.  Id. at 212–13.  
 119.  Segal v. Amazon.com, Inc., 763 F. Supp. 2d 1367, 1369 (S.D. Fla. 2011) (citation 
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 120.  See, e.g., Cvent, Inc. v. Eventbrite, Inc., 739 F. Supp. 2d 927, 936–37 (E.D. Va. 2010) 
(explaining that for a browsewrap agreement to be enforceable, the website user must 
have notice of the terms and conditions and assent to them). 
 121.  See infra note 126 and accompanying text. 
 122.  See, e.g., Anita Ramasastry, Facebook Follies: Why Facebook’s Recent Change to Its User 
Agreement Was a Bad Move, and Will Likely Be Unenforceable, FINDLAW (Feb. 24, 2009), 
http://writ.lp.findlaw.com/ramasastry/20090224.html. 
 123.  See Juliet M. Moringiello & William L. Reynolds, Electronic Contracting Cases 2008–
2009, 65 BUS. LAW. 317, 318 & n.8 (2009) (explaining that the first reported case on modi-
fication of an electronic contract was not until 2007). 
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senting contract terms that should pass muster in court.  Despite the 
holding of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in 
Douglas v. U.S. District Court for the Central District of California124 that a 
service provider cannot unilaterally change online terms without no-
tice,125 well-established online vendors continue to provide in their 
terms that they can modify terms without notice and that use of the 
service after such a modification will constitute assent to the modified 
terms.126 
In Douglas, the court concluded that a consumer was not bound 
by a modified electronic contract when the service provider changed 
the terms by posting a revised contract on its website.127  The contract 
at issue in Douglas was for telephone service.128  The customer had no 
reason to visit the service provider’s website regularly, and the court 
stressed that even if the customer visited the site regularly, he could 
not be expected to engage in a word-by-word comparison of the orig-
inal and modified contracts.129 
Likewise, in Roling v. E*Trade Securities, L.L.C.,130 the United 
States District Court for the Northern District of California found that 
a modification clause that required periodic comparison of past and 
present terms to discover modifications would likely be unenforcea-
                                                          
 124.  495 F.3d 1062 (9th Cir. 2007) (per curiam). 
 125.  Id. at 1065–66. 
 126.  See, e.g., iTunes Store – Terms and Conditions, APPLE, http://www.apple.com/legal/ 
itunes/us/terms.html#SERVICE (last visited Nov. 19, 2012) (“Apple reserves the right at 
any time to modify this Agreement and to impose new or additional terms or conditions 
on your use of the iTunes Service.  Such modifications and additional terms and condi-
tions will be effective immediately and incorporated into this Agreement.  Your continued 
use of the iTunes Service will be deemed acceptance thereof.”); Terms, GROUPON, 
http://www.groupon.com/terms#modification-of-this-agreement (last visited Nov. 19, 
2012) (“We reserve the right at all times to discontinue or modify any part of this Agree-
ment as we deem necessary or desirable.  If we make changes that materially affect your 
use of the Site or our services we will notify you by sending you an e-mail to the e-mail ad-
dress that is registered with your account and/or by posting notice of the change on the 
Site. . . .  We suggest that you revisit our Terms of Use from time to time to ensure that you 
stay informed of any such notifications of changes to the Site.”).  
 127.  Douglas, 495 F.3d at 1065, 1067. 
 128.  Id. at 1065. 
 129.  Id. at 1066. 
 130.  756 F. Supp. 2d 1179 (N.D. Cal. 2010). 
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ble.131  This expands, correctly in our view, the rule in Douglas.132  
Even if a customer regularly visits a site (which an E*Trade customer 
undoubtedly would do), the onus should not be on the customer to 
discover modifications unless something directs the customer’s atten-
tion to the changes. 
That said, the same court, several months later, implied that a 
regular website user should repeatedly check a website’s terms of ser-
vice for modifications.  The plaintiff in Swift v. Zynga Game Network, 
Inc.133 contended that she did not agree to the original contract terms 
because these terms were not displayed on the same page as the “Al-
low” button, but were accessible via a hyperlink adjacent to the but-
ton.134  The original terms provided that Zynga could modify the 
terms and that continued use of the game would constitute ac-
ceptance of the new terms.135  After the plaintiff registered for the 
game, Zynga replaced its terms of service.136  Without discussing the 
modification issue, the court found that the plaintiff had agreed to 
the original terms, describing those terms as “modified clickwrap.”137 
It is unfortunate that the court in Swift glossed over the modifica-
tion issue.  It is clear from the opinion that the plaintiff had adequate 
notice of the original terms at the time she signed up to play the Yo-
Ville game on Facebook.138  But the opinion does not discuss whether 
the link to the terms was easy to find after registration.  A conclusion 
one could draw from the opinion is that an individual playing a game 
on Facebook should read the terms every time she enters the game.139  
Could this possibly be correct if we do not expect the same diligence 
from an individual trading stocks within E*Trade? 
                                                          
 131.  See id. at 1190–91 (concluding that “a contractual provision that allows a party to 
unilaterally change the terms of the contract without notice is unenforceable”). 
 132.  See Douglas, 495 F.3d at 1066 (implying that the customer has no obligation to 
conduct a detailed comparison of original and modified contracts). 
 133.  805 F. Supp. 2d 904 (N.D. Cal. 2011). 
 134.  Id. at 910. 
 135.  Id. at 907–08. 
 136.  Id. 
 137.  Id. at 912. 
 138.  See id. at 908 (describing how the contract terms are presented when a user plays 
the YoVille game for the first time). 
 139.  See id. at 906–08, 912 (upholding a modified arbitration clause when the plaintiff 
continued using the online game after the contract terms changed). 
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Methods of modification, and of contracting originally, are also 
changing.  It is now well-established that an e-mail exchange can form 
and modify a contract.140  A court recently held that an instant mes-
saging conversation could modify a contract.141  In the early days of 
electronic contracting, some decried the lack of formality of e-mail 
and feared that allowing an e-mail exchange to form a contract would 
lead people into unintentional deals.142  Now that we have become 
accustomed to text messages and Twitter, should those methods of 
communication suffice to form binding agreements?  Or should more 
“substance” be required of a communication before it becomes en-
forceable?  We expect to see more modification cases in the future. 
Recent years have brought another attempt to fashion rules to 
govern some technology transactions.  This attempt, not in the form 
of a statute, is the American Law Institute’s Principles of the Law of Soft-
ware Contracts.143  Although limited to transactions in software, the 
Principles, like UCITA, sets forth some guidelines for determining 
whether electronically presented terms can result in a contract.144  
The project’s approach to electronically presented terms matured 
along with the judicial treatment of such terms; although an early 
draft blessed only terms that required a click to agree at the end of 
the standard form before payment,145 the final version adopted the 
view that terms are enforceable so long as they are reasonably com-
municated to the offeree.146  The old law of contract prevailed once 
again. 
                                                          
 140.  See Stephanie Holmes, Stevens v. Publicis: The Rise of “No E-Mail Modification” 
Clauses?, 6 WASH. J.L. TECH. & ARTS 67, 68–70 (2010) (explaining how both statutes and 
case law support formation and modification of contracts via e-mail). 
 141.  CX Digital Media, Inc. v. Smoking Everywhere, Inc., No. 09-62020-CIV, 2011 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 29999, at *31–36 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 23, 2011). 
 142.  See, e.g., Patrick A. Randolph Jr., Has E-Sign Murdered the Statute of Frauds?, 15 PROB. 
& PROP. 23, 25 (2001) (arguing that “E-sign legislation” may eliminate parties’ “chance to 
‘think twice’”). 
 143.  AM. L. INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF SOFTWARE CONTRACTS (2009) [hereinaf-
ter PRINCIPLES]. 
 144.  Id. at §§ 2.01, 2.02. 
 145.  AM. L. INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF SOFTWARE CONTRACTS, Preliminary Draft 
No. 2, § 2.01(c) (Aug. 10, 2005). 
 146.  PRINCIPLES, supra note 143, at § 2.02. 
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IV.  THE FUTURE 
The developments discussed above settle some questions about 
electronic contracts, but leave many questions unresolved. In this 
Part, we discuss arbitration clauses,147 privacy policies,148 mobile devic-
es,149 the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act,150 and intelligent agents.151 
A.  Arbitration 
Arbitration clauses are not unique to consumer electronic con-
tracts, but there would probably be very little case law on the enforce-
ability of electronic contract terms in their absence.152  Most courts 
that have struck down such clauses have done so finding some meas-
ure of procedural, as well as substantive, unconscionability.153  A no-
table exception has been courts applying California law, which re-
quires very little evidence of procedural unconscionability when a 
form contract contains an arbitration clause that requires a consumer 
to give up her right to bring a class action.154 
The recent Supreme Court of the United States decision in 
AT&T Mobility L.L.C. v. Concepcion,155 while not an electronic con-
tracting case, held that California’s treatment of consumer arbitration 
                                                          
 147.  See infra Part IV.A. 
 148.  See infra Part IV.B. 
 149.  See infra Part IV.C. 
 150.  See infra Part IV.D. 
 151.  See infra Part IV.E. 
 152.  For examples of cases dealing with arbitration clauses in electronic contracts, see 
Bragg v. Linden Research, Inc., 487 F. Supp. 2d 593 (E.D. Pa. 2007); Aral v. Earthlink, Inc., 
36 Cal. Rptr. 3d 229 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005); Hubbert v. Dell Corp., 835 N.E.2d 113 (Ill. App. 
Ct. 2005); Stenzel v. Dell, Inc., 870 A.2d 133 (Me. 2005).  
 153.  See, e.g., Bragg, 487 F. Supp. 2d at 611 (finding an arbitration clause in an online 
agreement procedurally and substantively unconscionable); Comb v. PayPal, Inc., 218 F. 
Supp. 2d 1165, 1172–77 (N.D. Cal. 2002) (same). 
 154.  See Ting v. AT&T, 319 F.3d 1126, 1149 (9th Cir. 2003) (agreeing with the lower 
court that an agreement, which contained an arbitration provision, was procedurally un-
conscionable when it imposed terms on consumers on a “take-it-or-leave-it basis”).  We dis-
cuss the California approach in Juliet M. Moringiello & William L. Reynolds, Survey of the 
Law of Cyberspace: Electronic Contracting Cases 2007–2008, 64 BUS. LAW. 199, 213–17 (2008) 
[hereinafter Moringiello & Reynolds, Survey 2007–2008].  
 155.  131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011). 
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clauses violated the Federal Arbitration Act.156  The Court conceded 
in a footnote that although a state cannot proclaim all arbitration 
clauses unconscionable, a state may provide that arbitration clauses 
must be presented in a prescribed manner, such as in bold type or in 
highlighted print.157  Concepcion presents lower courts with two op-
tions.  On the one hand, they may decide that a bold presentation of 
an arbitration clause is required; that requirement, of course, runs 
the risk of the Supreme Court saying that the language in Concepcion 
is only a footnote.158  On the other hand, courts may decide that the 
Supreme Court did not mean to defer to state rulings on unconscion-
ability;159 if so, then the resolution of consumer disputes will be left 
entirely in the hands of one-sided arbitration clauses. 
B.  Privacy 
Today, individuals take care of all sorts of personal matters elec-
tronically; they shop, pay bills, reconnect with old friends from high 
school, and even find potential mates.  Websites allow individuals to 
transact their personal business from anywhere at any time of day.  
These sites also allow their operators to collect detailed personal in-
formation about their users.160  Today’s online convenience comes 
with an enormous risk that personal information will get into the 
hands of people who can use it for nefarious purposes such as identity 
theft.161  Every website on which a consumer transacts her personal 
business has some kind of privacy policy, sometimes one mandated by 
                                                          
 156.  Id. at 1748, 1753. 
 157.  Id. at 1750 n.6. 
 158.  Id. (“Of course States remain free to take steps addressing the concerns that at-
tend contracts of adhesion—for example, requiring class-action-waiver provisions in adhe-
sive arbitration agreements to be highlighted.  Such steps cannot, however, conflict with 
the FAA or frustrate its purpose to ensure that private arbitration agreements are enforced 
according to their terms.”). 
 159.  See id. at 1747 (explaining that state law must give way when it conflicts with the 
Federal Arbitration Act). 
 160.  See Eugene Yannon, On-Line Purchasing, 35 MD. B.J. 40, 42 (2002) (stating that “in-
formation gathering technologies,” such as cookies and spyware, enable companies to 
gather personal information about Internet users). 
 161.  See id. at 43 (mentioning that “new information and e-commerce technologies in-
crease the risks to privacy exponentially”). 
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law.162  These privacy policies are presented in the same fashion as 
website terms of use: They tend to be behind a hyperlink at the bot-
tom of a webpage, presented in a way that does not encourage reader-
ship.163 
The United States lacks a general national privacy law.  Privacy 
legislation is sector-specific, with laws governing the confidentiality of 
financial information164 and health care information.165  The Federal 
Trade Commission (“FTC”) has the power to prohibit “unfair or de-
ceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce,”166 and it has used 
this power to police privacy policies in several high-profile cases.167  
Thus, in 2009, the FTC charged Sears with failing to disclose ade-
quately the scope of consumers’ personal information that it collected 
by a downloadable software application.168  The complaint arose out 
of a Sears market research program.169  To join, prospective members 
were asked to click their agreement to an online “Privacy Statement 
and User License Agreement” (“PSULA”) that was presented in a 
scroll box.170  The consent that Sears requested was more robust than 
that requested by the vast majority of clickwrap terms.171  Sears pro-
                                                          
 162.  For example, the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act requires that every financial institution 
provide a “clear and conspicuous disclosure” of its privacy policy to its customers.  15 
U.S.C. § 6803(a) (2006). 
 163.  See Woodrow Hartzog, Website Design as Contract, 60 AM. U. L. REV. 1635, 1664–70 
(2011) (discussing features of website design that hinder understanding of privacy poli-
cies). 
 164.  See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 6801(a) (2006) (“[E]ach financial institution has an affirma-
tive and continuing obligation to respect the privacy of its customers . . . .”). 
 165.  See 45 C.F.R. § 164.501(6)(v)(2) (2011) (defining “protected health infor-
mation”). 
 166.  15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2006). 
 167.  See, e.g., Dee Pridgen, Consumer Privacy in the Digital Marketplace: Federal Initiatives, 
33 WYO. LAW. 14, 15–16 (2010) (describing charges FTC brought against Twitter, whose 
“lax security practices” permitted hackers to access Barack Obama’s account). 
 168.  Complaint at 5, In re Sears Holdings Mgmt. Corp., FTC File No. 0823099 [herein-
after Complaint], available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0823099/090604sears 
complaint.pdf (last visited Nov. 20, 2012). 
 169.  Id. at 1. 
 170.  Id. at 3. 
 171.  Compare id. at 3–5 (alleging that Sears presented the PSULA in a scrollbox, which 
displayed ten lines at a time, and then asked registrants to click (1) the checkbox next to a 
statement that he agreed to the terms and (2) the “Next” button), with i.Lan Sys., Inc. v. 
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vided a link to a printable version of the terms and required the regis-
trants to click a checkbox next to the statement, “I am the authorized 
user of this computer and I have read, agree to, and have obtained 
the agreement of all computer users to the terms and conditions of 
the Privacy Statement and User License Agreement.”172  After clicking 
the checkbox, the registrants were required to click “Next” to obtain 
the application.173 
Hundreds of years of contract law have taught us that parties 
have the duty to read terms that are presented to them.174  Over a 
decade of electronic contracting law has implied that this is the case 
regardless of the number of screens that the terms occupy.175  The 
Sears terms were not unusually long; they occupied only eleven com-
puter screens.176  The participants in the Sears program, however, 
were installing software that tracked their Internet behavior, captur-
ing, among other things, online drug prescription records and online 
                                                          
Netscout Serv. Level Corp., 183 F. Supp. 2d 328, 338 (D. Mass. 2002) (finding that i.Lan 
accepted the clickwrap agreement simply by clicking “I agree”). 
 172.  Complaint, supra note 168, at 4–5. 
 173.  Id. at 5. 
 174.  See John D. Calamari, Duty to Read—A Changing Concept, 43 FORDHAM L. REV. 341, 
341 (1974) (“Every lawyer learned early in the course on contracts that a party may be 
bound by an instrument which he has not read.”); Stewart Macaulay, Private Legislation and 
the Duty to Read—Business Run by IBM Machine, the Law of Contracts and Credit Cards, 19 
VAND. L. REV. 1051, 1051 (1966) (noting the common “rallying cry” that a man cannot en-
ter into a contract and then try to get out of its terms by claiming he did not read them).  
This rule has many critics.  See, e.g., Alan M. White & Cathy Lesser Mansfield, Literacy and 
Contract, 13 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 233, 234 (2002) (using literacy research to explain that a 
large percentage of American adults would not understand contract documents and dis-
closures even if they read them).  
 175.  See, e.g., Feldman v. Google, Inc., 513 F. Supp. 2d 229, 236–38 (E.D. Pa. 2007) 
(holding that the plaintiff had the duty to read terms that were presented in a scroll box 
and required a click to agree and, therefore, the fact that the entire contract was not visi-
ble in the scroll box was irrelevant); Barnett v. Network Solutions, Inc., 38 S.W.3d 200, 204 
(Tex. Ct. App. 2001) (“Parties to a written contract have the obligation to read what they 
sign . . . .  The same rule applies to contracts which appear in electronic format.”); Scarcel-
la v. Am. Online, No. 1168/04, 2004 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 1578, at *5 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. Sept. 8, 
2004) (stating that although the long series of screens could induce a “trance of lethargy 
and inattentiveness,” the “law does not treat prolixity as evidence of deception”), aff’d, 811 
N.Y.S.2d 858 (N.Y. App. Div. 2005). 
 176.  Complaint, supra note 168, at Exhibit E.  
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banking statements.177  Although the FTC complaint stated that the 
software application functioned as described in the PSULA, it noted 
that a description of the software’s tracking function did not appear 
until the seventy-fifth line of the terms.178  Because Sears disclosed this 
function “[o]nly in a lengthy user license agreement, available to con-
sumers at the end of a multi-step registration process,” the FTC 
charged that it failed to disclose adequately the tracking software and 
thus engaged in a deceptive practice violating the FTC Act.179  Sears 
and the FTC ultimately settled the dispute.180 
In the Sears dispute, the question was not whether a contract was 
formed; it was whether Sears deceived the participants in its market 
research.181  In other words, even if a contract exists, some of its terms 
may violate some public policy.  Judicial intervention becomes im-
portant in such cases because modern communications allow con-
sumers to enter into very risky transactions from which public policy 
might intervene to protect them.  We have seen the use of public pol-
icy to protect consumers from forum selection clauses; in Scarcella v. 
America Online,182 for example, a small claims court in New York found 
that although the consumer plaintiff had agreed to AOL’s Terms of 
Service, presented in ninety-one computer screens, enforcing the fo-
rum selection clause would have required the plaintiff to travel from 
New York to Virginia to adjudicate his claim and, therefore, would vi-
olate the public policy behind small claims procedures.183 
Application of public policy is not unique to electronic transac-
tions.184  Consumer protection may be more important in electronic 
contracting, however, because electronic communications make it 
easier for consumers to transact with companies in far-flung locations 
                                                          
 177.  Id. at 4. 
 178.  Id. at 3, 5.  The scroll box displayed only ten lines at a time.  Id. at 3. 
 179.  Sears Settles FTC Charges Regarding Tracking Software, FED. TRADE COMM’N, 
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2009/06/sears.shtm (June 4, 2009) [hereinafter Sears Settles]. 
 180.  Id.  For a more detailed discussion of the FTC action against Sears, see Susan E. 
Gindin, Nobody Reads Your Privacy Policy or Online Contract? Lessons Learned and Questions 
Raised by the FTC’s Action Against Sears, 8 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 1 (2009). 
 181.  Sears Settles, supra note 179. 
 182.  No. 1168/04, 2004 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 1578 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. Sept. 8, 2004), aff’d, 811 
N.Y.S.2d 858 (N.Y. App. Div. 2005). 
 183.  Id. at *3–4, *8, *11–13. 
 184.  See, e.g., Licitra v. Gateway, Inc., 189 Misc. 2d 721, 732–33 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 2001) (re-
fusing to enforce an arbitration clause in paper terms because to do so would contravene 
small claims court policy). 
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and to give up sensitive personal information without realizing that 
they are doing so. 
C.  Do Smartphones Change the Game? 
Today, many consumer transactions are entered into not at a 
computer, but by use of mobile devices such as smartphones.185 To-
day’s smartphones are not only telephones, but are also handheld 
computers.186  Does a contract presented to a consumer by 
smartphone present any novel issues?  The distinguishing feature of 
mobile devices is their size.  Contract terms presented by smartphone 
are necessarily presented on a smaller screen than those presented on 
a computer.  For those terms to be readable, they must be “mobile-
optimized;” in other words, they must appear in readable font on the 
mobile device.187  A recent survey for TRUSTe, a privacy solutions 
provider, revealed that only two percent of mobile websites have a 
mobile-optimized privacy policy.188  If terms cannot be read on a 
smartphone, they are not reasonably communicated and, therefore, 
should not be part of the agreement. 
Once again, there is no need for new law but, of course, different 
factual scenarios might well require some creative judicial application 
of settled law to the new facts.  That process, of course, is how the 
common law adapts to meet changing conditions.189 
The mobile contracting regime, like the statutes governing elec-
tronic signatures generally, may be shaped by the financial services 
community.190  Today, mobile payments proliferate in many countries 
                                                          
 185.  See Timothy R. McTaggart & David W. Freese, Regulation of Mobile Payments, 127 
BANKING L.J. 485, 485 (2010) (stating that millions of people use their phones to pay for 
goods and services and to transfer funds). 
 186.  Id. 
 187.  Cheryl Hall, Moving Up with Mobility, DALL. MORNING NEWS, Sept. 22, 2010, at D1 
(describing a website “optimized for mobile”). 
 188.  Press Release: TRUSTe Privacy Index Reveals Alarming Trends, TRUSTE (Dec. 8, 2011), 
http://www.truste.com/about-TRUSTe/press-room/news_truste_2011_web_privacy_ 
index. 
 189.  Dennis J. Sweeney, The Common Law Process: A New Look at an Ancient Value Delivery 
System, 79 WASH. L. REV. 251, 284 (2004) (“The common law has the capacity to adapt to 
new technologies.  Of concern here is the way in which it adapts.”). 
 190.  The most popular type of mobile commerce applications are mobile banking and 
payment applications.  See E.W.T. Ngai & A. Gunasekaran, A Review for Mobile Commerce Re-
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around the world but not in the United States.191  Perhaps a regulato-
ry regime will grow up around those transactions, and that regime will 
be imposed on the wider community of mobile device contracting.  If 
not, the concerns associated with informal dealings on mobile devices 
may be influenced by an understanding of how consumers react to 
the informality of those devices. 
D.  The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act 
Another important issue for the future will involve the relation-
ship between electronic contracts and the Computer Fraud and 
Abuse Act (“CFAA”).  The CFAA, enacted to combat computer hack-
ing, makes it a crime to “intentionally access[] a computer without au-
thorization or exceed[] authorized access” and thereby obtain infor-
mation from a computer used in interstate communication.192  What 
is unauthorized access?  Is it access that is obtained by the breach of a 
code-based restriction on access?193  Or is it any access that violates a 
website’s terms of use?194  The CFAA provides no answer to these 
questions, so it will be up to the courts to decide the scope of the 
conduct prohibited by the CFAA.195 
Although Congress originally enacted the CFAA in 1984 to crim-
inalize computer hacking, today’s CFAA appears to do much more 
                                                          
search and Applications, 43 DECISION SUPPORT SYS. 3, 10 (2007) (“Currently, it seems that 
the most popular m[obile]-commerce application is that supporting financial activities.”).  
 191.  See Jongho Kim, Ubiquitous Money and Walking Banks: Environment, Technology, and 
Competition in Mobile Banking, 8 RICH. J. GLOBAL L. & BUS. 37, 102–03 (2008) (discussing 
the use of mobile payment technology in South Korea); Arnold S. Rosenberg, Better Than 
Cash? Global Proliferation of Payment Cards and Consumer Protection Policy, 44 COLUM. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 520, 548–52 (2006) (explaining the increasing use of mobile payment 
technology in Brazil, southern Africa, and South Korea). 
 192.  18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2) (2006).  
 193.  See Patricia L. Bellia, Defending Cyberproperty, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2164, 2253–54 
(2004) (defining unauthorized access as “extend[ing] only to breaches of . . . code-based 
limitations”). 
 194.  See United States v. Drew, 259 F.R.D. 449, 460 (C.D. Cal. 2009) (“[M]ost courts 
that have considered the issue have held that a conscious violation of a website’s terms of 
service/use will render the access unauthorized and/or cause it to exceed authoriza-
tion.”). 
 195.  See id. (analyzing courts’ varied approaches to “unauthorized use”). 
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than that.196  Congress substantially modified the CFAA several times 
between its initial enactment and 2010, expanding the reach of the 
statute with each amendment.197  Although the original statute was 
narrowly designed to criminalize only “federal interest computer 
crimes” such as the unauthorized acquisition of classified national se-
curity information or personal financial information, today’s CFAA 
could be read to regulate the use of every computer in the country.198  
That would be a bad reading; no one reads the terms of use199 and it 
would be very wrong to criminalize behavior that lacks a scienter 
component.200 
We believe that electronic contracting may permit or cause indi-
viduals to engage in risky transactions.  Unknowingly giving up privacy 
or intellectual property rights is risky.  Perhaps it is not unreasonable 
to expect people to read their terms to learn whether they are giving 
up those rights.  Still, it seems unreasonable to impose criminal sanc-
tions on those who engage in what seems to be universal behavior—
violation of terms of use that no one bothers to read.201  Surely, the 
criminal law can be refined to deal with serious bad behavior without 
making criminals of all of us due to our normal, everyday activities. 
United States v Drew,202 despite its awful facts, provides an example 
of how a wordy, never-read set of Internet terms can pose greater risks 
than most people can imagine.  Most people know the sordid facts 
behind Drew: Lori Drew, a Missouri mother, created a fake MySpace 
profile to pose as a sixteen-year-old boy.203  Using that profile, she 
communicated with a teenage girl, ultimately telling that girl that “he” 
was not interested in her and that “the world would be a better place 
without her in it.”204  After receiving the message, the teenage girl 
                                                          
 196.  Orin S. Kerr, Vagueness Challenges to the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 94 MINN. L. 
REV. 1561, 1561 (2010). 
 197.  Id. 
 198.  Id. at 1561–65. 
 199.  See infra notes 300–304 and accompanying text.  
 200.  Drew, 259 F.R.D. at 467 (explaining that, if every conscious breach of a website’s 
terms constituted unauthorized use of a computer, “[a]ll manner of situations will be cov-
ered from the more serious (e.g. posting child pornography) to the more trivial (e.g. post-
ing a picture of friends without their permission).  All can be prosecuted.”). 
 201.  See 18 U.S.C. § 1030(c) (2006) (establishing fines and terms of imprisonment for 
exceeding authorized use of a computer). 
 202.  259 F.R.D. 449 (C.D. Cal. 2009). 
 203.  Id. at 452. 
 204.  Id. 
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killed herself and Ms. Drew was prosecuted for, and initially convicted 
of, violating the CFAA for accessing a computer without authoriza-
tion.205  Her conviction was overturned, with the court finding: 
[I]f any conscious breach of a website’s terms of service is 
held to be sufficient by itself to constitute accessing a com-
puter without authorization or in excess of authorization, 
the result will be that [the CFAA] becomes a law that affords 
too much discretion to the police and too little notice to cit-
izens who wish to use the [Internet].206 
Drew did not close the door to contract-based CFAA prosecutions.  
Although the Department of Justice did not appeal the Drew ruling, it 
continues to take the position that conduct “exceeds authorized ac-
cess” for CFAA purposes if the conduct violates a website’s terms of 
use.207  Such a position leads to the extraordinary result of allowing a 
website owner, who proffers terms of use comprising thousands of 
words and dozens of screens, to define criminal conduct.208 
E.  Intelligent Agents 
Both E-Sign and UETA recognize that a contract may be formed 
by electronic agents.  Under E-Sign, a contract may not be denied en-
forceability solely because it was formed by the actions of one or more 
electronic agents, so long as the action of such an electronic agent is 
attributable to the person sought to be bound.209  The UETA sets 
forth a similar rule, stating that a contract may “be formed by the in-
teraction of electronic agents of the parties, even if no individual was 
aware of or reviewed the electronic agents’ actions or the resulting 
                                                          
 205.  Jennifer Steinhauer, Verdict in the MySpace Suicide Case, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 26, 2008), 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/27/us/27myspace.html. 
 206.  Drew, 259 F.R.D. at 467–68 (citation omitted) (internal quotations omitted). 
 207.  See Cyber Security: Protecting America’s New Frontier: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on 
Crime, Terrorism and Homeland Security of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 38–39 
(2011) (statement of Orin S. Kerr, Professor of Law, George Washington University) (ex-
plaining the Department of Justice’s interpretation of the CFAA as including even mun-
dane violations of a website’s terms of service). 
 208.  Drew, 259 F.R.D. at 465 (suggesting that, if a breach of a website’s terms of service 
constitutes a violation of the CFAA, then the website owner “ultimately defines the crimi-
nal conduct”). 
 209.  Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act, 15 U.S.C. § 7001(h) 
(2006). 
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terms and agreements.”210  These statutes are facilitative; they do not 
say that all agreements formed by electronic agents are enforceable, 
but they recognize that an agreement formed by electronic agents 
may be enforced. 
These statutes were written over a decade ago.211  Courts have de-
cided several cases involving electronic agents but have rarely at-
tached any significance to the involvement of electronic agents in the 
transactions.212  A recent opinion from British Columbia addressed a 
dispute between the real estate company Century 21 and Zoocasa, a 
company that ran a real estate search engine.213  To obtain its listings, 
Zoocasa accessed the Century 21 website daily, in contravention of the 
Century 21 Terms of Use.214  The court addressed the significance of 
the fact that Century 21’s site was accessed repeatedly not by a human 
being, but by an automated program, and recognized that machine-
made contracts are nothing new.215  Ultimately the court held that the 
involvement of an automated program was irrelevant for two reasons: 
First, an employee reviewed the layout of the Century 21 website be-
                                                          
 210.  UNIF. ELEC. TRANSACTIONS ACT § 14(1), 7A U.L.A. 272 (1999). 
 211.  See Anthony M. Balloon, Comment, From Wax Seals to Hypertext: Electronic Signatures, 
Contract Formation, and a New Model for Consumer Protection in Internet Transactions, 50 EMORY 
L.J. 905, 909 (2001) (stating that E-Sign was promulgated in 2000); see also Jennifer A. 
Puplava, Use and Enforceability of Electronic Contracting: The State of Uniform Legislation Attempt-
ing to Regulate E-Commerce Transactions, 16 MICH. ST. J. INT’L L. 153, 155 (2007) (noting that 
UETA was finalized in 1999). 
 212.  See, e.g., Register.com v. Verio, Inc., 356 F.3d 393, 396, 401–03 (2d Cir. 2004) (rea-
soning that although defendant accessed the plaintiff company’s site using an automated 
software program (or “robot”), it did not argue that it had no actual notice of plaintiff’s 
terms as a result of its access by robot).  But see Internet Archive v. Shell, 505 F. Supp. 2d 
755, 764–66 (D. Colo. 2007) (acknowledging that although the lack of human consent to 
terms might doom a party’s breach of contract claim, the defendant’s allegations of the 
existence of a contract, breach, and damages were sufficient to withstand the plaintiff’s 
motion to dismiss the defendant’s counterclaim for breach of contract). 
 213.  Century 21 Canada L.P. v. Rogers Commc’ns Inc., 2011 BCSC 1196. 
 214.  Id. ¶ 37–40. 
 215.  Id. ¶ 128.  The court noted a 1971 English case involving a plaintiff who parked his 
car in an automated parking lot.  Id.  In that case, the court held that the contract offer 
was made when the proprietor of the parking lot held the machine out as being ready to 
accept the plaintiff’s money.  Once the plaintiff inserted the money into the machine, the 
offer was accepted.  Id.  
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fore any automated program indexed the website, and second, a hu-
man being programmed the automated indexing program.216 
We question whether the involvement of humans in automated 
contracting will always be so clear.  Today, the law views an electronic 
agent as a legal agent and holds the human responsible for the soft-
ware as a principal.217  This is the view reflected in UETA and E-
Sign.218  Computer programs that operate autonomously, meaning 
that they can learn through experience and modify their own behav-
ior as a result of this experience, have been in existence for years.219  
Some have predicted that as autonomous agents develop, they will be 
able to exercise free will that is independent of their human develop-
ers.220  Software agents of the future may be able to make choices and 
decisions in such a way that the humans for whom they act may have 
no knowledge of the identity of their trading partners.221  If that is the 
case, there may not be a human to hold accountable when something 
goes wrong in a transaction consummated by the thinking software 
agent.222 
At the end of the day, no new contract law will likely be neces-
sary; after all, the automated agents will be making contracts for some 
legal person, who will be required to assume responsibility for its 
agent, even if that agent is not a human. If changes need to be made 
to the law at all, they will likely involve the legal definition of “per-
son.”223  Granting a computer program legal personhood might seem 
                                                          
 216.  Id. ¶ 129–30.  
 217.  See supra text accompanying notes 209–210. 
 218.  See supra text accompanying notes 209–210. 
 219.  See Tom Allen & Robin Widdison, Can Computers Make Contracts?, 9 HARV. J.L. & 
TECH. 25, 27 (1996) (observing, in 1996, that “computer systems are now emerging that 
can operate not just automatically but autonomously”); Stephen T. Middlebrook & John 
Muller, Thoughts on Bots: The Emerging Law of Electronic Agents, 56 BUS. LAW. 341, 346 (2000) 
(explaining, in 2000, that “technology exists or is in development to implement full trad-
ing bots that will make purchase decisions on behalf of users”). 
 220.  Allen & Widdison, supra note 219, at 27; Bert-Jaap Koops et al., Bridging the Ac-
countability Gap: Rights for New Entities in the Information Society?, 11 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. 
497, 508 (2010). 
 221.  Allen & Widdison, supra note 219, at 28. 
 222.  See id. at 28–29 (asking whether the law can cope with new technology enabling 
autonomous transactions); Koops et al., supra note 220, at 510 (same).  
 223.  See Koops et al., supra note 220, at 517 (“If companies and associations can be legal 
persons, why not software agents, as well?”); see also Allen & Widdison, supra note 219, at 35 
(discussing the possibility of the law conferring legal personhood on a computer). 
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like a bizarre science fiction ploy, but it may not be any more un-
thinkable than giving “person” status to a corporation or a ship.224  
The unresolved question from a contract perspective would then be-
come not “who is liable?”, but “how will that person pay?”  Perhaps 
businesses could be required to register their software agents in a 
public registry that would indicate both the extent of the agent’s lia-
bility and the party liable for that agent’s actions.225  Such a registry 
would be similar to a state’s corporation records.226 
The intelligent agent problem illustrates the beauty of facilitative 
statutes like UETA and E-Sign.  Because of their technology-neutral 
nature, they can accommodate advances in computer technology.227  
Because they do not purport to be substantive contracting statutes, 
they assure us that a contract may not be denied enforceability solely 
because an electronic agent was used in its formation.228  Of course, 
whether an intelligent agent has notice of terms will be an issue, but 
that issue is not new.229  Because electronic agents act in ways intend-
ed by their programmers, courts determine whether a contract has 
been formed by looking to the notice given to the electronic agent’s 
owner.230  If an electronic agent were to be held independently liable 
for its actions, courts would be required to determine whether ade-
                                                          
 224.  See Allen & Widdison, supra note 219, at 35 (discussing how contract law already 
recognizes ships and corporations as legal persons); Koops et al., supra note 220, at 516 
(same). 
 225.  See Steffen Wettig & Eberhard Zehendner, A Legal Analysis of Human and Electronic 
Agents, 12 ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE & L. 111, 128 (2004) (proposing a register for elec-
tronic agents); see also Allen & Widdison, supra note 219, at 42 (suggesting a system of reg-
istration for electronic agents); Koops et al., supra note 220, at 539 (discussing Wettig’s 
and Zehendner’s suggestion). 
 226.  Allen & Widdison, supra note 219, at 42. 
 227.  See Janet P. Knaus & Timothy E. Folay, Electronic Records and Signatures: The Federal 
E-Sign Act and Michigan UETA Place Them on Legal Par with Their Paper and Ink Counterparts, 
80 MICH. B.J. 39, 40 (2001) (stating that E-Sign and UETA are written in “technology-
neutral terms”).  
 228.  See id. at 41 (“Both laws are procedural, not substantive.”); see also supra text ac-
companying notes 209–210. 
 229.  See supra note 33 and accompanying text. 
 230.  See Century 21 Canada L.P. v. Rogers Commc’ns Inc., 2011 BCSC 1196 (noting 
that an employee of the defendant reviewed the website of the plaintiff before employing 
the automated agent to index the website); James Grimmelmann, The Structure of Search 
Engine Law, 93 IOWA L. REV. 1, 25 (2007) (discussing how the Second Circuit imputed 
knowledge of contractual terms to a “spidering” program’s operator).  
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quate notice, in computer-readable form, had been given to the elec-
tronic agent.  Computers have been communicating with each other 
for decades, so that will not be a difficult problem to solve.231 
These are all important and interesting questions, of course, but 
we believe that courts will approach them using the same analytic 
tools they have developed over the past several centuries of looking at 
face-to-face transactions and then at increasingly distant transactions.  
As Lord Coke said, “out of the old Fields must spring and grow the 
new Corn.”232 
V.  REFLECTIONS 
These developments naturally lead any law professor to reflect on 
what did and did not happen and why.  Here we consider four ques-
tions.  First, why did some statutory solutions work when others did 
not?233  Second, should there be a different law for online transac-
tions?234  Third, why did academics in particular want to change the 
common law in the Internet world?235  Fourth, why is contract law so 
resilient, so adaptable, that it can accommodate effortlessly to a radi-
cally new and disruptive technology?236 
A.  Statutes 
It is interesting to consider the efforts at statutory reform of elec-
tronic contracting.  There have been four serious efforts at nation-
wide reform.  Two were successful and two were not.  Earlier, we dis-
cussed two statutes, E-Sign and UETA, which were adopted swiftly 
almost everywhere.237  But there also have been two major reform ef-
forts, UCITA and the Principles of the Law of Software Contracts, that 
                                                          
 231.  See Allen & Widdison, supra note 219, at 26 (describing, in 1996, how computers 
“can be programmed automatically to issue a standard offer and to both acknowledge and 
record acceptances from trading partners”). 
 232.  Preface to the First Part of the Reports of Sir Edward Coke Kt. (E. & R. Nutt and R. Gos-
ling, London, 1727). 
 233.  See infra Part V.A. 
 234.  See infra Part V.B. 
 235.  See infra Part V.C. 
 236.  See infra Part V.D. 
 237.  See supra notes 39–43 and accompanying text.  
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have failed.238  These failed reform efforts focused on a specific type 
of contract, the contract for computer information, or software.239  
Computer information transactions involve myriad intellectual prop-
erty issues.240  For instance, software contracts raise a question as to 
the extent to which contracts can abrogate intellectual property rights 
granted by federal law.241  In addition, many software transactions are 
labeled as licenses rather than sales, even when the transaction has 
many, if not all, the characteristics of a sale.242  These intellectual 
property questions remain as controversial today as they were fifteen 
years ago.243  Yet, because transfers of software are often accomplished 
by modern contracting methods, including shrinkwrap, clickwrap, 
and browsewrap, the proponents of these reform projects felt com-
                                                          
 238.  See Moringiello & Reynolds, What’s Software Got to Do with It?, supra note 18, at 
1541–42 (arguing that the Principles do not address the unique characteristics of software 
and noting that UCITA was adopted in only two states). 
 239.  Id.; see also supra text accompanying note 66. 
 240.  See Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, Will Increased Disclosure Help? Evaluating the Recom-
mendations of the ALI’s “Principles of the Law of Software Contracts,” 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 165, 169 
(2011) (noting courts’ struggle to resolve “contract and intellectual property law issues” in 
software transactions). 
 241.  The Copyright Act governs “all legal or equitable rights that are equivalent to any 
of the exclusive rights within the general scope of copyright . . . in works of authorship that 
are fixed in a tangible medium of expression and come within the subject matter of copy-
right.”  17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (2006).  The tension between this provision and standard form 
contracts for information is explained in ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1454–55 
(7th Cir. 1996).  See also Boss, supra note 76, at 203–04 (“[L]icensors use licenses to get 
more than they are granted by intellectual property law . . . by placing limitations on the 
rights granted to licensees by applicable intellectual property law . . . and by creating limi-
tations on use of information that is not even protected by intellectual property law.”); Da-
vid Nimmer et al., The Metamorphosis of Contract into Expand, 87 CALIF. L. REV. 17, 23 (1999) 
(“[B]y making provisions of software licenses presumptively enforceable while providing 
no limitations on overreaching contract terms that proprietors may unilaterally decide to 
impose, Article 2B facilitates known practices designed to alter the ‘delicate balance’ [of 
copyright law].”). 
 242.  See Kim, supra note 10, at 1328 (explaining that software companies chose to li-
cense, rather than sell, their products because of the ease of copying software).  
 243.  See Marotta-Wurgler, supra note 240, at 166–66 (describing the controversy sur-
rounding whether software license agreements “extend intellectual proections beyond 
those afforded by federal intellectual property laws”). 
  
2013] FROM LORD COKE TO INTERNET PRIVACY 489 
pelled to address modern contracting issues in their products.244  Any 
set of rules attempting to address both the intellectual property and 
contract issues was doomed to fail. 
The UCITA was a dismal failure, with adoptions only in Virginia 
and Maryland.245  It was a more ambitious statute than E-Sign and 
UETA because it attempted to revise a broad swath of contract law as 
applied to computer information transactions.246  The failure was all 
the more spectacular because the American Law Institute, which had 
joined NCCUSL in the UCITA project, ultimately withdrew its sup-
port.247  Finally, there is the Principles of the Law of Software Contracts, 
promulgated by the American Law Institute in 2009.248  The Principles, 
carefully drafted over a long period by two very able Reporters, fo-
cused on software contracts, but in doing so addressed many areas of 
                                                          
 244.  For a discussion of how UCITA and the Principles responded to address modern 
contracting issues, see Moringiello & Reynolds, What’s Software Got to Do with It?, supra note 
18, at 1547–52. 
 245.  MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW §§ 22-101 to 22-816 (LexisNexis 2005); VA. CODE ANN. 
§§ 59.1-501.1 to 59.1-509.2 (LexisNexis 2006).  Several states passed “bomb shelter” stat-
utes that forbade courts from enforcing UCITA if choice-of-law rules suggested that it 
should be deployed.  Moringiello & Reynolds, What’s Software Got to Do with It?, supra note 
18, at 1541–42; see, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 554D.125 (West 2012); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 
66–329 (LexisNexis 2011); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-8-15 (LexisNexis 2008). 
UCITA was the product of a joint drafting committee of the NCCUSL and the Ameri-
can Law Institute, an impeccable partnership.  See Press Release, Nat’l Conference of 
Comm’rs on Uniform State Laws & Am. Law. Inst., NCCUSL to Promulgate Freestanding 
Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act: ALI and NCCUSL Announce that Legal 
Rules for Computer Information Will Not Be Part of UCC, available at 
http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/computer_information_transactions/pressrel4
99.htm (last visited Feb. 1, 2013) (describing the history of the partnership between the 
NCCUSL and the American Law Institute).  Its failure cannot be attributed to its parent-
age. 
 246.  See UNIF. COMPUTER INFO. TRANSACTIONS ACT § 114, 7 U.L.A. 280 cmt. n.1 (2009) 
(“This section deals with pre-transaction disclosures of contract terms in Internet transac-
tions where the contract is formed on-line for an electronic delivery of information.”).   
 247.  See James D. Hornbuckle, Comment, The Uniform Computer Information Transaction 
Act: State Legislatures Should Take a Critical Look Before Clicking Away Consumer Protections, 23 
WHITTIER L. REV. 839, 847 (2002) (explaining that the American Law Institute withdrew 
its support from UCITA). 
 248.  Moringiello & Reynolds, What’s Software Got to Do with It?, supra note 18, at 1541. 
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electronic contracting.249  Although it is too early to call the Principles 
a failure, it has received little attention from either courts or com-
mentators.250 
Why the difference in success among these four projects? The 
successful statutory fixes involved simple adjustments to well-settled 
law that were not at all controversial.251  E-Sign and UETA merely 
made clear that electronic signatures were as valid as, say, a letter-
head.252  Although courts probably would have gotten there on their 
own,253 the statutes were helpful in moving the process along.  The 
important point is that the two laws were quick fixes to a readily un-
derstood problem. 
In contrast, the unsuccessful fix, UCITA, attempted to re-
organize the world of contracts for information.254  Although con-
tracts for information (such as software) may be made on paper, the 
                                                          
 249.  See id. at 1542–43, 1547–52 (stating that the Principles addressed a range of contract 
issues, as well as offered guidance in solving software-specific problems). 
 250.  Only one court has cited the Principles.  Conwell v. Gray Loon Outdoor Mktg. Grp., 
Inc., 906 N.E.2d 805, 811 & n.7 (Ind. 2009).  It has done better in the law reviews, in part 
because of several symposia devoted to the project as well as several articles written by the 
Reporters.  See, e.g., Robert A. Hilllman, Contract Law in Context: The Case of Software Con-
tracts, 45 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 669, 669 (2010) (citing the Principles); Robert A. Hillman & 
Maureen A. O’Rourke, Principles of the Law of Software Contracts: Some Highlights, 84 TUL. L. 
REV. 1519, 1519 (2010) (same); Marotta-Wurgler, supra note 240, at 165 (same); Moringiel-
lo & Reynolds, What’s Software Got to do With It?, supra note 18, at 1542 (same). 
 251.  See Amelia Rawls, Contract Formation in an Internet Age, 10 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. 
REV. 200, 208–09 (2009) (contrasting the controversial UCITA with the widely accepted 
UETA and E-Sign). 
 252.  See supra text accompanying notes 12–14. 
 253.  Courts long recognized, even before the enactment of UETA and E-Sign, that a 
signature need not be a handwritten name.  See, e.g., Owen v. Kroger Co., 936 F. Supp. 579, 
585 (S.D. Ind. 1996) (holding that preprinted wording on a memorandum form could 
constitute a signature for Statute of Frauds purposes); Durham v. Harbin, 530 So. 2d 208, 
210 (Ala. 1988) (recognizing that letterhead could suffice as a signature in the appropriate 
circumstances).  As a result, courts did not shy away from holding that electronic signa-
tures affixed to e-mail messages could satisfy the Statute of Frauds even with respect to 
contracts entered into before the enactment of UETA and E-Sign. See, e.g., Cloud Corp. v. 
Hasbro, Inc., 314 F.3d 289, 295–96 (7th Cir. 2002) (“[W]e conclude without having to rely 
on [E-Sign] that the sender’s name on an e-mail satisfies the signature requirement of the 
statute of frauds.”). 
 254.  See Boss, supra note 76, at 171–72 (describing how UCITA eventually shifted focus 
to “information policy issues”). 
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Article 2B/UCITA project unavoidably addressed electronic contract 
formation issues because the proliferation of computer technologies 
not only made information an important commodity, but also provid-
ed an important medium for the exchange of all things of value.255  
The effort was bound to fail because there were too many actors who 
tried to push the result in too many directions, even though there was 
no consensus that anything at all needed to be fixed.256  In short, 
UCITA, was a solution in search of a problem.257  Even groups as well-
respected and experienced as NCCUSL and the American Law Insti-
tute could not compromise sufficiently to satisfy everyone.  Thus, 
those unhappy with the result in the end were able to muster suffi-
cient blocking power to ensure that the law was not adopted.258  The 
lesson here is that efforts to pin down the future, as a comprehensive 
statute does, will meet resistance unless there is a strongly felt need 
for the change. 
Similarly, the American Law Institute’s project, Principles of Soft-
ware Contracts, met with a lackluster response259 because it too was 
driven by a reformist agenda when there was no consensus that any-
thing needed to be reformed.260  Again, failure—or at least neglect—
can be attributed to the lack of a felt need for change and the ab-
sence of strong forces pushing for the change. 
As a result of these two failures, there is no widely applicable 
American statute today that specifically addresses electronic contract 
formation.  Absent a strong case for change, courts are seen as the in-
                                                          
 255.  See id. at 170–71 (noting the “commoditization of information” and describing 
demands on the law to adapt to this development). 
 256.  See Nim Razook, The Politics and Promise of UCITA, 36 CREIGHTON L. REV. 643, 645–
46 (2003) (explaining the initial opposition to UCITA). 
 257.  See Michele C. Kane, When Is a Computer Program Not a Computer Program? The Per-
plexing World Created by Proposed U.C.C. Article 2B, 13 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1013, 1013(1998) 
(asserting that Article 2B “mak[es] the simple complex” by “creat[ing] distinctions within 
computer programs”); Nimmer et al., supra note 241, at 19 (“[T]o the extent that Article 
2B aspires to protect copyright owners from improper uses of copyrighted works, it solves a 
non-problem.”).  
 258.  See supra note 245 and accompanying text. 
 259.  Lackluster is perhaps not a strong enough term.  See supra note text accompanying 
250. 
 260.  For a good discussion of whether specialized contract law is desirable, by the Re-
porter for the Principles of the Law of Software Contracts, see Hillman, supra note 249, at 669.  
At the first meeting of the Members’ Consultative Group for the Principles project, one of 
us asked why the project was needed.  No satisfactory explanation was ever offered. 
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stitution best suited to deal with whatever special problems might be 
presented by electronic contracting.  And that makes enormous 
sense.  Contract law represents centuries of judges pondering how to 
handle concrete problems.  There must be a very good reason to strip 
them of that responsibility, and none has yet appeared.  Lord Coke 
was right: The old fields do grow the new corn.261 
B.  Different Laws for Different Folks? 
Whether courts should distinguish among types of agreements—
paper, oral, or online—remains an open question.  Of course, some 
differentiation is created by positive law.  The most prominent exam-
ple is Article 2 of the UCC, differentiating between the sale of goods 
and other contracts, although examples go back much farther, such 
as the Statute of Frauds passed in 1677.262  Some online terms, such as 
those offered by financial institutions, are regulated by federal law.263  
The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, for example, requires that terms of-
fered by financial institutions be conspicuous.264 
But courts left to their own devices have treated most contract is-
sues as controlled by the same law of “contract.”  The real question, 
therefore, is whether there is anything peculiar to electronic contract-
ing that would cause courts to treat it differently from other contract-
ing problems.  As we have explained, we believe that there is no rea-
son to treat the two differently.265  And courts and legislatures have 
agreed. 
There is also the question of whether a new law of contracting 
should be created for separate classes of persons who contract elec-
tronically.  The obvious candidate here is the class of consumers.266  It 
is easy to argue that online contracting poses dangers to the average 
consumer even greater than those presented by paper contracts.  
While paper might impart a certain seriousness to a transaction, con-
                                                          
 261.  Preface to the First Part of the Reports of Sir Edward Coke Kt. (E. & R. Nutt and R. Gos-
ling, London, 1727). 
 262.  See infra note 311. 
 263.  See 15 U.S.C. § 6803(a) (2006) (governing the confidentiality of financial infor-
mation). 
 264.  Id. 
 265.  See supra Part I. 
 266.  See, e.g., Marotta-Wurgler, supra note 240, at 165–66 (articulating the concern that 
the use of shrinkwrap and browsewrap licenses “may not effectively put [consumers] on 
notice of the [contractual] terms” and, thus, consumers may be agreeing to unfair terms). 
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sumers, it can be argued, are so accustomed to instant gratification 
online that they pay little serious attention to the fact that they are ac-
tually entering into binding arrangements.267  One study made in the 
context of the clickwrap/browsewrap debate found that no matter 
what form of assent was demanded of a buyer using a website, con-
sumers spent seconds in agreeing to the proffered terms.268  In other 
words, consumers simply paid no attention to the terms of the deal.269 
Horrifying as these examples may be, it is not clear that consum-
ers dealing with paper contracts are any more savvy than electronic 
consumers.270  If that is so, then little reason exists to distinguish be-
tween online and paper agreements.  In other words, although cogent 
reasons can be advanced for differentiating between consumer and 
other contracts, as the European Union has done,271 that does not jus-
tify a special rule for online agreements. 
Perhaps a better argument can be advanced in support of treat-
ing minors differently.  After all, minors make up a sub-set of the con-
sumers whom the law grants more protection than it does to adult 
consumers.272  We only know of one case discussing minors and elec-
                                                          
 267.  See id. at 178 (suggesting that few consumers take the time to review and to under-
stand online terms). 
 268.  Id. at 178–79. 
 269.  See id. at 182 (“[N]o matter how prominently [the terms] are disclosed, they are 
almost always ignored.”). 
 270.  Cf. Robert A. Prentice, “Law and” Gratuitous Promises, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 881, 909 
n.173 (2007) (stating that “[m]ost people do not read most of the form contracts they 
sign”). 
 271.  See, e.g., Directive 97/7/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 
May 1997 on the Protection of Consumers in Respect of Distance Contracts, 1997 O.J. (L 
144) 19, 20–21 (extending consumer protection in all mail or electronic transactions other 
than financial services); Directive 1999/44/EC, of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 25 May 1999 on Certain Aspects of the Sale of Consumer Goods and Associated 
Guarantees, 1999 O.J. (L 171) 12, 14 (providing uniformity in sale of consumer goods).  It 
is unlikely that American law will accept this distinction in the foreseeable future; after all, 
that distinction was drawn in the proposed Article 2 revisions to the UCC, and it was one 
of the reasons that revision met with no success.  See supra text accompanying notes 73–76. 
 272.  See Cheryl B. Preston, CyberInfants, 39 PEPP. L. REV. 225, 227 (2012) (explaining 
the infancy doctrine); Victoria Slade, Note, The Infancy Defense in the Modern Contract Age: A 
Useful Vestige, 34 U. SEATTLE L. REV. 613, 616–17 (2011) (discussing how the infancy law 
doctrine is meant to protect minors from forming contracts with “‘crafty adults who would 
take advantage of them in the market place’” (quoting Halbman v. Lemke, 99 Wis. 2d 243, 
245 (1980))). 
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tronic contracts, A.V. v. iParadigms, L.L.C.273  The facts there are fairly 
simple.  A high school required its students to submit papers to a 
company called Turnitin to have them checked for plagiarism.274  The 
company did so by comparing submitted papers with other papers it 
had in its archives; it then reported the results back to the school.275  
To submit their papers, the students had to click their agreement to 
Turnitin’s terms, which included a disclaimer.276  Although the stu-
dents clicked their assent, they wrote on the submitted papers that 
they did not want Turnitin to archive their work.277  The students then 
sued for copyright infringement.278  The court held for the defendant: 
Although a minor generally cannot enter into a contract, an agree-
ment is binding when she receives and retains a benefit.279  Here, the 
benefit was passing the course.280 
Assuming the decision correctly stated contract law for adults,281 
should there have been a different rule adopted for minors operating 
in an electronic world?  Is there something about minors’ inexperi-
ence, inattention, or perhaps that they are especially targeted by 
sellers that should assure them more protection when they enter into 
online agreements?282  We do not know the answers to these ques-
tions, but we suspect that contract law will not change to reflect them.  
There is an awful lot of room for courts to achieve just results when 
                                                          
 273.  544 F. Supp. 2d 473 (E.D. Va. 2008), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 562 F.3d 630 (4th 
Cir. 2009).  We discussed the case in Moringiello & Reynolds, Survey 2007–2008, supra note 
154, at 211–12. 
 274.  iParadigms, 544 F. Supp. 2d at 477–78. 
 275.  Id. 
 276.  Id. at 478. 
 277.  Id. 
 278.  Id. at 477–78. 
 279.  Id. at 481.   
 280.  Id.  Although this may be a strained notion of benefit, it is hard to find much sym-
pathy for plaintiffs who apparently had access to sophisticated legal advice. 
 281.  See i.Lan Sys., Inc. v. Netscout Serv. Level Corp., 183 F. Supp. 2d 328, 338–39 (D. 
Mass. 2002) (holding that a contract was formed when the buyer clicked on box stating “I 
Accept,” even though the buyer also attempted to bargain for other terms).  
 282.  These arguments and others are made in Slade, supra note 272, at 628–37.  It 
could also be argued that minors need more protection because their technological exper-
tise might lead them to be over-confident.  See id. at 623 n.64 (“Today, a new generation of 
computer-savvy minors sits confidently in front of their computer screens fearlessly and 
effortlessly initiating a multitude of contracts in cyberspace.”). 
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they use terms like “benefit” or “unjust.”  That is the beauty of con-
tract law, after all—the combination of a rigid rule (minors cannot 
enter into contracts) with fuzzy escape devices (unless they have re-
tained a benefit). 
For instance, one study of cases involving terms of use concluded 
that passive media users are less likely to be bound to terms of use 
than those who interact more directly with websites.283  Another study 
showed that individuals spent seconds in agreeing to the proffered 
terms.284  In other words, consumers simply paid no attention to the 
terms of the deal.285  Perhaps the terms offered to those former users 
are not enforceable at all, as one author concluded as a result of an 
empirical study of seventy-five websites’ terms of use and privacy poli-
cies.286  Maybe no one cares; after all, how likely will there be a con-
flict over the NYTimes.com terms of use involving someone who visits 
the site only to read articles and not to comment on them?  Moreover, 
some terms that are deemed important by vendors and purchasers are 
offered not behind links but prominently on a web page.  For exam-
ple, the hospitality industry literature is rich with research regarding 
the prominence of terms such as price and cancellation policies.287 
                                                          
 283.  See Woodrow Hartzog, The New Price to Play: Are Passive Online Media Users Bound by 
Terms of Use?, 15 COMM. L. & POL’Y 405, 424–30 (2010) (concluding that passive media us-
ers may not be bound to terms of use because “they often lack notice, are typically less so-
phisticated than businesses, and might lack the intent to contract”). 
 284.  Marotta-Wurgler, supra note 240, at 178. 
 285.  Id. at 182. 
 286.  Andrea M. Matwyshyn, Mutually Assured Protection: Toward Development of Relational 
Internet Data Security and Privacy Contracting Norms, in SECURING PRIVACY IN THE INTERNET 
AGE 73, 80 (Anupam Chander et al. eds., 2008) (finding that “a traditional browsewrap 
format . . . does not provide the requisite notice to users”). 
 287.  See, e.g., Robert H. Wilson, Internet Hotel Reservations: Recent Changes and Trends in 
the Enforcement of Click Wrap and Browse Wrap “Terms and Conditions/Terms of Use”, 52 
CORNELL HOSPITALITY Q. 190, 192–93 (2011) (explaining that hotel sites ask users to click 
their agreement to terms involving cancellation policies and that the browsewrap terms of 
use are directed sometimes at third-party commercial use of the sites); see also Rob Law & 
Rachel Wong, Analysing Room Rates and Terms and Conditions for the Online Booking of Hotel 
Rooms, 15 ASIA PAC. J. OF TOURISM RES. 43, 53 (2010) (explaining that users of hotel web-
sites are most concerned with information such as room prices and cancellation policies).  
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C.  Academics 
The institutional question is why academics preferred long dis-
cussions of the virtues and vices of clickwrap and browsewrap instead 
of relying on the glories of the common law of contracts.  Part of the 
answer is the incredible hostility that UCITA engendered.288  Any-
thing that UCITA approved necessarily had to be bad and thus the in-
tensely hostile reaction among academics. 
Beyond that, however, the popularity of special rules for click-
wrap and browsewrap says a lot about how academics operate.  It is 
unlikely that many articles would have been written about how elec-
tronic contracting problems would be solved under the existing rules 
of contract.  After all, if you believe that the new technology does not 
need new rules, you are unlikely to write an article saying so.289  In 
other words, little academic credit goes to those who say merely that 
the old stuff works.  Tenure committees look for dramatic, game-
changing pieces, and an article that merely extols the old ways is not 
going to set racing the pulse of a senior professor.  In a similar vein, 
law review editors are much more likely to be impressed by those who 
proffer a new paradigm than by those who say nothing new is need-
ed.290  In other words, academic writing tends to the novel because 
novelty is its own reward. 
Law professors also like to “complexify.”291  That is, they like to 
devise tests that are complicated enough to show their intellect.  It is 
not enough to use terms like “reasonable”; rather, the quest is to 
identify test criteria that lead to very specific results, even in complex 
situations.  The various “wrap” distinctions lent themselves perfectly to 
this innate desire to “complexify”—a most unfortunate development. 
                                                          
 288.  See supra note 83 and accompanying text. 
 289.  But see Frank H. Easterbrook, Cyberspace and the Law of the Horse, 1996 U. CHI. 
LEGAL F. 207, 208 (providing a prophetic account of the uselessness of a special law of 
computers). 
 290.  See Jordan H. Leibman & James P. White, How the Student-Edited Law Journals Make 
Their Publication Decisions, 39 J. LEGAL EDUC. 387, 414 (1989) (stating that in making publi-
cation decisions, law review editors consider whether a manuscript “break[s] new ground 
or is . . . duplicative”). 
 291.  The term was first used in a promotions committee meeting at one of our schools; 
the professor under review wrote in a very difficult fashion.  One of the professor’s de-
fenders remarked that anyone can simplify, but it is a challenge to “complexify.”  We reject 
that analysis. 
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Finally, the neat classification of electronic contracts into a tri-
partite world (like Caesar’s Gaul) seems to satisfy an innate urge for 
law professors to classify legal problems into reasonably defined bun-
dles in order to limit judicial discretion.  Judicial discretion does not 
sit well in the academy; perhaps professors view all judges as intent on 
creating evil.292  Judges, by contrast, adore discretion; they do not like 
to be cabined by rules.293  To them, “reasonably communicated” is a 
perfect test because it gives judge and jury considerable leeway to do 
justice as they see fit.294 
That said, electronic contracting has given some academics the 
opportunity to reexamine some timeless contract questions in creative 
ways.  The nature of the standard form contract has been debated 
endlessly.295  Standard form terms shatter the very paradigm on which 
contract law is based: assent by knowledgeable parties.296  Should 
standard form contracts be governed by traditional offer and ac-
ceptance rules?  One does not need to be a legal scholar to know that 
very few people read the standard form terms.297  Despite that fact, 
courts hew to the rule that so long as terms are reasonably communi-
                                                          
 292.  This can be noted in many areas.  One example is choice of law, where the profes-
soriate has tried to replace the very open methods of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6 (1971), with complex rules designed expressly to limit discretion.  
See WILLIAM M. RICHMAN & WILLIAM L. REYNOLDS, UNDERSTANDING CONFLICT OF LAWS 
266–68 (3d ed. 2002) (explaining academics’ desire to limit judicial discretion by offering 
rules for conflict of laws questions). 
 293.  See Anthony T. Kronman, The Problem of Judicial Discretion, 36 J. LEGAL EDUC. 481, 
481 (1986) (discussing how judges have “discretionary space” where they enjoy “freedom 
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 294.  See Larry A. DiMatteo, Counterpoise of Contracts: The Reasonable Person Standard and 
the Subjectivity of Judgment, 48 S.C. L. REV. 293, 347–48 (1997) (discussing how discretion is 
a “necessary ingredient” in contract law to suit the “judicial sentiment of wanting to do jus-
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 295.  See, e.g., David Zaring, CFIUS as a Congressional Notification Service, 83 S. CAL. L. REV. 
81, 112 n.133 (2009) (describing the debate on whether “boilerplate is a sign of bargain-
ing power and, potentially, oppression by the drafter”) 
 296.  Hillman & O’Rourke, supra note 250, at 1529 (“It is common knowledge (and 
well-documented) that people do not read their standard forms before signing them and 
that the electronic age has not mitigated the problem, but may have exacerbated it.”).  
 297.  This fact was recognized long before online terms became common.  See, e.g., Mel-
vin Aron Eisenberg, The Limits of Cognition and the Limits of Contract, 47 STAN. L. REV. 211, 
213 (1995) (explaining that individuals rarely act according to the standard economic 
model of rational choice because of the various limits on cognition). 
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cated from the offeror to the offeree, they can result in a contract.298  
As a result, efforts to reform the law of contracts have been geared 
towards increasing disclosure, not towards regulating terms.299 
Although it is easy to surmise that no one reads standard form 
terms, electronic contracting methods enable researchers to learn 
more about the behavior of individuals who purchase items online.  
Researchers can use clickstream data to determine how much time a 
reader spends on a web page,300 and they can easily manipulate the 
presentation of terms to determine whether particular presentation 
formats can affect readership.301  Studies in which researchers have 
done so indicate that individuals spend very little time reading online 
terms,302 and they believe that such terms are too long and time-
consuming, that they all say the same thing, and that they offer con-
sumers no choice but to accept or reject all of the terms.303  All of 
these factors increase the probability that those who enter into these 
contracts will put their own rights at risk without knowing that they 
are doing so.  One such study showed, however, that readership in-
creased when the terms were presented in a short form, when the 
reader was notified at the beginning that the form contained unique 
terms, and when the terms indicated that they could be modified.304  
Such research can provide valuable information to policymakers as 
they try to determine the best way to regulate contracts of both the 
                                                          
 298.  See supra note 87. 
 299.  Consumer protection legislation provides an example of the disclosure approach.  
For example, the Truth in Lending Act mandates and regulates disclosure of loan terms, 
not the loan terms themselves.  15 U.S.C. § 1631 (2000). 
 300.  See Marotta-Wurgler, supra note 240, at 173–82 (describing a study of the Internet 
browsing habits of 47,399 households). 
 301.  Victoria C. Plaut & Robert P. Bartlett III, Blind Consent? A Social Psychological Inves-
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 302.  See Marotta-Wurgler, supra note 240, at 178–79 (presenting the results of a study 
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 304.  Id. 
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paper and electronic varieties.  Maybe eventually, American policy-
makers will reach the conclusion that disclosure alone is not suffi-
cient. 
D.  Resilience, or Handle with Care 
Contract law is precious stuff, easily mishandled but hardy 
enough to survive for hundreds of years.  It must be definite enough 
to give predictability to costly transactions that might last for many 
years, and it must be supple enough to let the parties do what they 
want, within broad limits, and yet indefinite enough also to permit 
judges to do their job—to provide justice.  Our law of contracts often 
amazes and frustrates students because it so often giveth with the one 
hand and taketh with the other.  There are rules and counter-rules.  
Thus, students are told that express conditions must be literally com-
plied with,305 and then they learn that the harshness of that rule is sof-
tened with the mushiness of doctrines such as waiver,306 substantial 
performance,307 and “the law abhors a forfeiture.”308 
That mushiness is, of course, what makes contracts work.  A party 
contemplating breach of an express condition knows that harsh re-
sults may follow unless she can convince the court that the other party 
has waived performance of the condition.309  The expectations about 
performance are clear, in other words, and so are the grounds under 
which performance will be excused.  What is not clear is which will 
prevail.  Because the firm rule favors plaintiffs and the excusing rule 
favors defendants, however, the burden of proof favors plaintiffs.310  
Potential defendants, therefore, know theirs is the more difficult path 
by far. 
That flexibility has enabled contract law to survive for half a mil-
lennium.  Not only has contract law rejected hard-and-fast rules, but 
when legislators have attempted to codify some of those rules, the 
courts have softened them.311  Contract law has survived because it is 
                                                          
 305.  E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 8.3, at 510 (4th ed. 2004). 
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firm enough to give guidance to those who use it to order their daily 
lives, and flexible enough to permit change when needed.  And by re-
sisting specialization it accumulates enough experience to provide a 
great deal of guidance.  It is truly a marvelous doctrine.  No wonder it 
survived efforts to create a special rule for electronic contracts. 
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